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Casenotes
Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co.
and the Abolition of Total Equitable
Indemnity: What a Long, Strange Trip
It's Been*
In Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co.,' the California Supreme
Court effectively eliminated the concept of total equitable indem-
nity.2 In Far West, the court ruled that a good faith settlement by
a tortfeasor precludes subsequent actions for total equitable indem-
nity by vicariously liable defendants.' The decision in Far West
resolved a disagreement among the California Courts of Appeal
regarding the theoretical distinctions between contribution and in-
demnity.4 The theoretical disagreement was manifested by conflicting
* The Grateful Dead, Truckin', Am:ExcAN BFAuTY (Warner Bros., Inc. 1970).
1. Far West Financial Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 760 P.2d 399, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 202 (1988).
2. Id. at 809, 760 P.2d at 407-8, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 210-11. Indemnity is a contract by
which one engages to save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of some other
person. CAL. CIV. CODE § 2772 (West Supp. 1989). Total equitable indemnity is the noncon-
tractual equitable shifting of liability from a nonculpable party to a culpable party. City of
San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958). See infra notes 17-32 and
accompanying text for discussion of total equitable indemnity.
3. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 817, 760 P.2d at 413, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 216.
4. See infra notes 104-191 and accompanying text examining the disagreement between
the Courts of Appeals. Indemnity shifts the entire loss between joint tortfeasors. Contribution,
on the other hand, involves equal sharing between tortfeasors. See, e.g., Herrero v. Atkinson,
227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1964).
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interpretations of the settlement provisions of California Code of
Civil Procedure section 877.6.
5
The split among the Courts of Appeal resulted from the California
Supreme Court's recognition of loss sharing between tortfeasors in
the landmark case of American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court.6
The decision in American Motorcycle overcame the deficiencies in
the California Joint Judgment Statute7 by introducing comparative
negligence into multidefendant litigation.8 In 1980, the California
Legislature codified the holding in American Motorcycle by enacting
California Civil Procedure Code section 877.6 which bars subsequent
claims for "equitable comparative contribution, or partial or com-
parative indemnity, based on comparative negligence or comparative
fault ' after a good faith settlement. 9 The confusion among the
California Courts of Appeal whether American Motorcycle dealt
with contribution or indemnity led to a split of authority regarding
whether section 877.6 bars claims by vicariously or derivatively liable
defendants for total indemnity after good faith settlements by joint
tortfeasors.'0
Part I of this note discusses the legal background leading to the
confusion among the California Courts of Appeal."' Part II sum-
marizes the facts of Far West and reviews the decision of the
5. California Civil Procedure Code section 877.6(c) provides:
A determination by the court that the settlement was made in good faith shall bar
any other joint tortfeasor or co-obligor from any further claims against the settling
tortfeasor or co-obligor for equitable comparative contribution, or partial or com-
parative indemnity, based on negligence or comparative fault.
CAL. CiV. PROC. CODE § 877.6(C) (West Supp. 1989).
6. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978).
7. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-877 (West Supp. 1989).
8. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 599-600, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
The California Supreme Court introduced comparative negligence between joint tortfeasors
under the aegis of "partial indemnity." Id. "Partial indemnity," however, is simply contri-
bution created by states frustrated with inequitable restrictions imposed by contribution or
joint judgment statutes. RESTATEmENT (SEcoNm) OF TORTs § 886B, comment m (1977). See
infra notes 65-79 and accompanying text for a discussion of the introduction of loss sharing
in American Motorcycle.
9. Compare CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp, 1989) (good faith settlement
bars further claims for "equitable comparative contribution, or partial or comparative indem-
nity") with American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d at 603-4, 578 P.2d. at
915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-199 (1978) (good faith settlement must discharge subsequent
claim for partial or comparative indemnity). See also Angelus Assocs. v. Neonex Leisure
Prods., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 537, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 407 (1985) (section 877.6 is a
codification of the holding in American Motorcycle).
10. See infra notes 105-190 and accompanying text (discussing the split of authority among
the California Courts of Appeals).
11. See infra notes 14-190 and accompanying text.
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California Supreme Court.'2 Part III discusses the legal ramifications




A. History of Indemnity and Contribution in California
The confusion surrounding contribution and indemnity arose un-
der California's attempt to allocate loss according to the relative
degrees of culpability of the parties to an action. Indemnity seeks
to shift the entire liability paid to the plaintiff, while contribution
seeks recovery of a proportionate part of the sum paid to the
plaintiff. 4 Indemnity rights have existed in California since 1872,15
while rights to contribution have existed only since 1957.16 The
historical background behind contribution and indemnity highlight
the confusion culminating in the Far West decision.
1. Indemnity
The right to indemnity arises from an express contract between joint
7
12. See infra notes 191-267 and accompanying text.
13. See infra notes 268-322 and accompanying text.
14. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886B, comment a (1977). See also Herrero v.
Atkinson 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1964) (indemnity shifts the entire
loss between joint tortfeasors, while contribution involves equal sharing between tortfeasors).
15. See CAL. CIV. CODE § 2772 (West 1974) (definition of indemnity).
16. See CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §§ 875-877 (West 1980 and Supp. 1989).
17. See CAL. CrV. CODE § 1430 (West 1982) (obligations imposed on persons are either
joint, several, or joint and several). Joint and several liability generally arises in four distinct
situations. DoBBs, TORTS AND COMPENSATION (West, 1985) (discussing joint and several liability).
First, tortfeasors acting "in concert" are subject to joint and several liability. E.g., Gray v.
Sutherland 124 Cal. App. 2d 280, 289-90, 268 P.2d 754, 761 (1954) (those who act in concert
are joint tortfeasors) See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979) (persons acting in
concert). See generally, Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CALnF. L. Rnv. 413, 418
(1937) (historically, the rule of entire liability for joint tortfeasors applied only to those
tortfeasors who acted in concert).
Second, joint and several liability arises where the tortfeasors produce a single indivisible
injury. Finnegan v. Royal Realty, 35 Cal. 2d 409, 433-34, 218 P.2d 17, 32 (1950) (joint and
several liability imposed for indivisible harm). See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 879
(1979). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433A (1965) (defining single and divisible
harm).
Third, joint and several liability arises where one tortfeasor directs or permits the conduct
of the other. RESTATEMENT (SECoND) OF TORTS § 877 (1979). California adopts a more restricted
view than the Restatement with regard to directing or permitting the conduct of another. See
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tortfeasors' s or in an implied contractual 19 or equitable o setting.2' In
City of San Francisco v. Ho Sing,22 the California Supreme Court
based the right to total indemnity on equitable considerations deter-
mined by the relative culpability of the tortfeasor defendants2 3 Follow-
ing the decision in Ho Sing, indemnity between joint tortfeasors not
involved in a contractual relationship came to be known as total
equitable indemnity.2 However, the court left the role of determining
the scope of total equitable indemnity to the lower courts.zY The
Orser v. George 252 Cal. App. 2d 660, 60 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1967) (triable issue of fact arose
as to whether defendant knew codefendant's acts were tortious and was encouraging codefen-
dant's acts by his own tortious conduct).
Fourth, joint and several liability arises where the tortfeasors are under a common duty.
RESTATEMENT (SEcOND) OF TORTS § 878 (1979).
18. California Civil Code § 2772 states: "Indemnity is a contract by which one engages
to save another from a legal consequence of the conduct of one of the parties, or of some
other person." CAL. CIV. CODE § 2772 (West 1974). Express contractual indemnity provisions
must be specific in their terms. See Markely v. Beagle, 66 Cal. 2d 951, 962, 429 P.2d 129,
136, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816 (1967) (absent specific language, "general" indemnity clause
provides indemnity for loss resulting only from indemnitee's "passive" negligence, not "active"
negligence); Goldman v. Ecco-Phoenix Elec. Corp., 62 Cal. 2d 40, 44, 396 P.2d 377, 379, 41
Cal. Rptr. 73, 75 (1964) (agreement for indemnification must be clear and specific and strictly
construed against the indemnitee).
19. See San Francisco Unified School Dist. v. California Bldg. Maintenance Co., 162 Cal.
App. 2d 434, 328 P.2d 785 (1958) (implied indemnification agreement in window washing
contract between school district and maintenance company for injuries to employee of main-
tenance company). Although the basis of the right to implied contractual indemnity is
contractual, the right must be consistent with the principles of equity. See, e.g., Cahill Bros.
v. Clemintina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367, 382, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 309 (1962) (right to implied
contractual indemnity barred where negligence is "active").
20. BAJI, No. 12.67-12.68 (7th ed. 1986) (right to implied noncontractual indemnity is
based on findings that there was a specified legal relationship between the indemnitee and the
indeninitor and that the indemnitee was not personally negligent). Indemnification of a
vicariously liable principal by a fault source agent is an example of implied noncontractual
indemnity. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B (1979) (indemnity between tortfeasors).
21. See RETSATErENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886B(2)(a)-(f) (1979) (instances in which
indemnity may be granted). For a comprehensive work on indemnity, see Molinari, Tort
Indemnity in California, 8 SAN~TA CLAA LAW. 159 (1967). See also infra notes 65-79 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the recent development of loss sharing under the concept
of partial or comparative indemnity.
22. City of San Francisco v. Ho Sing, 51 Cal. 2d 127, 330 P.2d 802 (1958).
23. Id. Ho Sing involved an action for indemnity between the city and a building owner
arising from a prior suit. Id. at 129-30, 330 P.2d at 802-3. The city was held liable for
damages resulting from a dangerous condition created and maintained by the building owner
on his property. Id. at 130-31, 330 P.2d at 803-4. The California Supreme Court held that
non-contractual indemnity could be based on: a "special relationship"; active/passive negli-
gence; primary/secondary liability; direct/derivative liability; or general principles of equity
and justice. Id. at 130-34, 330 P.2d at 803-6.
24. Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity Under Comparative Negligence: Anomaly or
Necessity? 74 CAUF. L. REv. 1057, 1066 (1986) (non-contractual indemnity following the
decision in Ho Sing known as total equitable indemnity).
25. See City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 874, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 764, 767 (1981) (although the Ho Sing court identified a number of rationales for allowing
total equitable indemnity, the decision failed to identify upon which theory the court relied).
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California courts developed concepts such as active/passive negligence26
and primary/secondary liability27 for purposes of determining relative
culpability among joint tortfeasors and whether to permit an action
for indemnity. 28 Interchange in use29 and difficulty in application °
invariably led to criticism by the courts of the viability of the concepts
of active and primary liability.31 Further, since the active fault of many
26. Active negligence is "conduct which may consist of participation with another in an
affirmative act of negligence," or the "connection with an act or omission of another by
knowledge of or acquiescence in such act or omission." Wrrx:N, SUMMARY oF CALIroRZA
LAW, Torts § 92(2) (9th ed. 1988). The active-passive test purported to focus on degrees of
fault by allowing the party with less culpability (the "passive" party) to be indemnified by
the person found to be more culpable (the "active" party). Comment, Total Equitable
Indemnity: Can it Pierce a Pretrial Settlement? 20 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 99, 107 (1987). See, e.g.,
Pierce v. Turner, 205 Cal. App. 2d 264, 23 Cal. Rptr. 115 (1962) (affirmative negligence of
defendant bars right to indemnity); Cahill Bros. v. Clementina Co., 208 Cal. App. 2d 367,
382, 25 Cal. Rptr. 301, 309 (1962) (participation in an affirmative act of negligence bars right
of indemnification).
27. Secondary liability, as distinguished from primary liability, rests upon fault that is
imputed or constructive only, being based on some legal relation between the parties, or arising
from some positive rule of common or statutory law or because of a failure to discover or
correct a defect or remedy a dangerous condition by the act of the one primary responsible.
Alisal Sanitary Dist. v. Kennedy, 180 Cal. App. 2d 69, 75, 4 Cal.' Rptr. 379, 383 (1960) (citing
Builders Supply Co. v. McCabe, 366 Pa. 322, 325-28, 77 A.2d 368, 370-71 (1951)).
28. See Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity: Can it Pierce a Pretrial Settlement? 20
Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 99, 107-110 (1987) (discussing the lack of consistent standards among the
California courts in determining the availability of indemnity among tortfeasors).
29. See, e.g., Aerojet Gen. Corp. v. D. Zelinsky & Sons, 249 Cal. App. 2d 604, 610, 57
Cal. Rptr 701, 705 (1967) (omission by the plant owner was secondary and passive, while the
negligence of the contractor was immediate and active); San Francisco Examiner Div., Hearst
Publishing Co. v. Sweat, 248 Cal. App. 2d 493, 497, 56 Cal. Rptr. 711, 714 (1967) (indemnity
involves considerations of both primary and secondary liability and concepts of active and
passive conduct).
30. E.g., Muth v. Urricelqui, 251 Cal. App. 2d 901, 60 Cal. Rptr. 166 (1967). In Muth,
the Court of Appeals allowed a general contractor to recover indemnity from a subcontractor
who had negligently graded a lot, although the general contractor had neglected to supervise
the grading. The court held that the general contractor's negligence was "passive" and the
subcontractor's negligence was "active". Consequently, the general contractor was entitled to
indemnity from the subcontractor. Id. 251 Cal. App. 2d at 909-12, 60 Cal. Rptr. at 170-72.
At least one commentator pointed out the inherent subjectivity involved in determining whether
a tortfeasor's conduct was active or passive. See Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among
Joint Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. Rnv. 728, 738 (1968) (asking whether the conduct of the
general contractor in Muth was active in staying away from the site or passive in falling to
go to the site and inspect). Similarly, a court could have found that the subcontractor either
passively failed to grade the lot properly or actively graded improperly. Id. at 738.
31. Kerr Chems. Inc. v. Crown Cork & Seal Co., 21 Cal. App. 3d 1010, 1014, 99 Cal.
Rptr. 162, 164 (1971) (attempts to distinguish the line between primary and secondary liability
are often difficult); Pearson Ford Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 273 Cal. App. 2d 269, 272, 78
Cal. Rptr. 279, 282 (1969) (attempts to classify indemnitor's conduct as "active," "primary,"
or "positive" have been unsuccessful); Atchison, Topeka & San Francisco Ry. v. Franco, 267
Cal. App. 2d 881, 886, 73 Cal. Rptr. 660, 664 (1968) (criteria for determining the availability
of indemnity are artificial and lack objectivity for determining predictability in the law). See
also RE STATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886B, comment c (1979) (expressions such as active
and passive negligence or primary and secondary responsibility have proved misleading in some
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defendants barred total shifting of all liability, the right to indemnity
was unavailable in a majority of cases.3 2
2. Contribution
California initially adopted the two common law rules governing
loss sharing among joint tortfeasors3  in multidefendant litigation:
the doctrine of joint and several liability and the prohibition of loss
sharing between culpable tortfeasors.3 4 California's early procedural
applications).
Two subsequent cases cast further confusion on the criteria used to determine availability
of indemnity by allowing indemnity between successive actively negligent tortfeasors. See Niles
v. City of San Rafael, 42 Cal. App. 3d 230, 116 Cal. Rptr. 733 (1974) (indemnity allowed
when negligence of treating doctors compounded negligence of original tortfeasor); Herrero v.
Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490 (1964) (original tortfeasor allowed indemnity
from treating doctors who negligently administered blood transfusion during subsequent
operation on plaintiff). See Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity Under Comparative Negli-
gence: Anomaly or Necessity? 74 CA~in. L. Rav. 1057, 1070 (1986) (the availability of indemnity
in Niles and Herrero effectively rejected the basic tenet that a party's active negligence bars
his claim for total equitable indemnity).
32. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 595, 578 P.2d
899, 910, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 193 (1978) (the great majority of cases do not require the
imposition of the entire loss upon one or another tortfeasor).
33. Historically, the term "joint tortfeasor" had two implications: a plaintiff could join
to an action only those who acted in concert to commit a trespass and each was held liable
for the entire result. KEETON, DOBBS, KEETON, & OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS §§
46, 47, at 322-23, 324-25 (5th ed. 1984) Otherwise, a defendant was severally liable for the
entire loss sustained by the plaintiff, even though his negligence combined with that of another
to produce the harm. Prosser, Joint Torts and Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. Rnv. 413, 418
(1936). The common law definition of "joint tortfeasor" eventually developed to include those
whose conduct combines to produce an injury whether acting jointly or in succession.
ScHwARTz, CompARATIvE NEGHOENCE § 252 (1974).
34. See, e.g., Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co., 162 Cal. 136, 121 P. 379 (1912). The
California Supreme Court stated:
[A]ny such wrongdoer cannot ... insist that any or all of his associates in the act
shal bear with him the burden of defending against the claim of the injured party
or of compensating him for the injury. There is no right of contribution among
them. They are all jointly and severally liable, as the injured party may elect. The
injured party may sue all or any of them jointly, or each separately, or, having
secured a joint judgment against all, enforce such judgment by execution against
one only...
Id. at 139, 121 P. at 380 (quoting Fowden v. Pacific Coast S.S. Co., 149 Cal. 151, 157, 86
P. 178, 180 (1906)). The common law doctrine barring loss sharing between joint tortfeasors
originated in the case of Merryweather v. Nixan, 8 Term. Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B.
1799) (barring contribution between intentional tortfeasors). RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS
§ 886A, comment a (1979). One rationale for the common law rule denying assistance to
tortfeasors is that they are wrongdoers and thus not deserving of the aid of courts in achieving
equal or proportionate distribution of the common burden. Id. The common law rule was
also justified on a deterrence rationale. See Leflar, Contribution and Indemnity Between
Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. Rav. 130, 133-34 (1932) (arguing that because no defendant in a
pool of co-defendants could know in advance if the plaintiff would choose to demand payment
from one defendant or another, each arguably had an incentive to avoid or prevent accidents).
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rules, however, inevitably led to harsh and inequitable results.35 First,
the procedural rules governing civil suits prohibited defendants from
joining other negligent tortfeasors to the action. 6 Second, if the
plaintiff chose to sue several defendants, the plaintiff retained the
power to choose who would satisfy the judgment, regardless of fault
or ability to satisfy the judgment.37 Finally, early California law
prohibited a joint tortfeasor from bringing an action to recover any
of the judgment paid regardless of his or her share of fault. 8 Hence,
when a plaintiff joined tortfeasors to an action, damages could not
be apportioned between the tortfeasors and judgment for the full
amount would be rendered against each.
39
In 1957, the California Legislature enacted the California Joint
Judgment Statute. 40 The Joint Judgment Statute departed from com-
mon law principles in two areas: loss allocation between joint tort-
feasors and discharge and release provisions .4  Under the Joint
35. See Note, Contribution and Indemnity Collide with Comparative Negligence-The New
Doctrine of Equitable Indemnity, 18 SANTA CLARA L. Rav. 779, 781 (1978) (contribution
adopted in order to promote settlement and eliminate the harsh consequences of rules
prohibiting allocation of loss).
36. See, e.g., Reed v. Wing, 168 Cal. 706, 712, 144 P. 964, 967 (1914) (cross-complaint
not permitted for the purpose of joining a new party not necessary in deciding the matter
before the court); Alpers v. Bliss, 145 Cal. 565, 570, 79 P. 171, 173 (1904) (cross-complaint
for affirmative relief not permitted against one who is not already a party to the action). See
also, Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity Under Comparative Negligence: Anomaly or
Necessity? 74 CAm. L. RPv. 1057, 1061-2 (1962) (common law rule barring contribution
among co-defendants, combined with common law rules governing civil suits, led to inequities
in the allocation of loss).
37. 1851 Cal. Stat. ch. 5, see. 32 at 56 (enacting CAL. Civ, PRoC. CODE § 414) provided:
"When the action is against two or more defendants jointly or severally liable on a contract,
and the summons is served on one or more, but not all of them, the plaintiff may proceed
against the defendants served in the same manner as if they were the only defendants." 1969
Cal. Stat. ch. 1610, sec. 15 at 3373 (repealing CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 414).
38. Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal. 710, 712-13, 195 P. 389, 391 (1921) (payor of
judgment has no right of contribution from joint tortfeasor); Dow v. Sunset Tel. & Tel. Co.,
162 Cal. 136, 121 P. 379 (1912) (if one satisfies a judgment, no right accrues to seek
contribution from joint tortfeasor).
39. See, e.g., Hallinan v. Prindle, 220 Cal. 46, 55, 29 P.2d 202, 206 (1934); Oldham v.
Aetna Ins. Co., 17 Cal. App. 2d 144, 146, 61 P.2d 503, 504 (1936) (verdict held invalid for
attempted apportionment).
40. 1957 Cal. Stat. ch. 1700, sec. 1 at 3076 (enacting CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE §§ 875-880).
The purpose of the Joint Judgment Statute was to alleviate the deficiencies under the existing
doctrine of total indemnity regarding equitable allocation of loss between joint tortfeasors.
See Fourth Progress Report to the Legislature by the Senate Interim Committee on the
Judiciary, 129-30, 1 Appendix to Senate Journal (1957 Reg. Sess.) ("Under the common law
there is no contribution between joint tortfeasors... The purpose of this bill is to lessen the
harshness of that doctrine."). See also Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity Under Compar-
ative Negligence: Anomaly or Necessity? 74 CALiF. L. Ray. 1057, 1072 n.81 (1986) (doctrine
of contribution developed at roughly the same time as development of doctrine of indemnity).
41. See generally, Comment, Indemnity in California: Is it Really Equitable after American
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Judgment Statute, a defendant, jointly and severally liable for the
whole damage done to the plaintiff, may seek contribution from
another defendant only after a joint judgment has been rendered and
the joint judgment debtor has paid more than his or her pro rata
share.42 The Joint Judgment Statute also mandates that a release
discharges only those defendants to whom releases are given,43 dis-
charges a settling joint tortfeasor from further claims by nonsettling
tortfeasors for contribution, 44 and reduces the claims against the
nonsettling tortfeasors on a pro tanto basis. 45
Despite the attempt by the legislature to equitably allocate fault
under the Joint Judgment Statute, the statutory scheme failed to
fairly apportion loss between joint tortfeasors. 46 The requirement of
joint judgment liability prevented joinder by named defendants of
additional defendants via cross-complaint. 47 Consequently, plaintiffs
retained absolute control over the litigation and could refuse to sue
or obtain judgment against one or more of the joint tortfeasors.4
The Joint Judgment Statute perpetuated the power of the plaintiff
to confer immunity upon chosen tortfeasors and secure complete
compensation from others. 49 Further, the Joint Judgment Statute
Motorcycle and section 877.6? 18 PAC. L.J. 201, 206-7 (1986) (discussing the effects of the
California Joint Judgment Statute). Note that California retained the traditional common law
bar to contribution among intentional tortfeasors. CAL. Crv. PRoc. CODE § 875(d) (West 1980).
42. CAL. Civ. PRoc. CODE § 875 (West 1980). Pro rata apportions liability according to
the tortfeasors proportionate share. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th ed.) (definition of pro
rata).
43. CAL. Cirv. PRoc. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1989) (release of one or more tortfeasors
or co-obligors does not discharge any other tortfeasor). The Joint Judgment Statute abandoned
the common law release provisions under prior law. See KEETON, DOBBS, KETON & OWEN,
PROSSER & KEETON ON TORTS, supra note 34, § 47 at 324-25 (at common law, the plaintiff
had only one cause of action against all tortfeasors and a release of one tortfeasor from
liability operated a release of all tortfeasors from liability).
44. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 877 (West Supp. 1989) (discharging settling tortfeasor from
further liability for contribution).
45. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 877(a) (West Supp. 1989) (claims against nonsettling tort-
feasors reduced by the amount of consideration paid for the release). "Pro tanto reduction"
reduces the judgment by as much as is paid for the release. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (5th
ed.).
46. See Gregory, Tort Contribution Practice in New York, 20 CORNELL L.Q. 269 (1935)
(criticizing requirement of joint judgment liability as a predicate to rights to contribution in
New York joint judgment statute).
47. Adams, Settlements after Li: But is it "Fair?" 10 PAC. L.J. 734 (1979). In order to
implead a third party defendant for contribution, the named defendant had to show that the
third party defendant "is or may be liable to the [named defendant] for all or part of the
plaintiff's claim against him." CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 428.10 (West Supp. 1989). Since the
Joint Judgment statute requires joint judgment liability, no basis exists for impleading third
party defendants for contribution. Adams at 734 n.33.
48. Adams, Settlements after Li: But is it "Fair?" 10 PAC. L.J. 734 (1979) (discussing
the problems associated with California's Joint Judgment Statute).
49. Id.
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inequitably apportioned loss between joint tortfeasors by requiring
pro rata apportionment between joint tortfeasors who were not
equally culpable. 0
The enactment of the Joint Judgment Statute retained the theo-
retical differences between contribution and indemnity.5' Indemnity
shifts liability 2 while contribution presupposes that tortfeasors should
share responsibility.5 3 The doctrinal distinctions between contribution
and indemnity highlighted California's inadequate attempts to ap-
portion loss based on the relative degrees of culpability of the
tortfeasors.5 4 The failure of total indemnity and the Joint Judgment
Statute to proportionately allocate fault gave rise to a judicially
created system of loss allocation between joint tortfeasors based on
relative culpability.55 The California Supreme Court recognized loss
sharing between plaintiffs and defendants in Li v. Yellow Cab Co.
5 6
and between joint tortfeasors in American Motorcycle Association v.
Superior Court.1
7
50. See id. at 733-34 (illustrating problems which arise under the pro rata system of
assessing liability). Assume that a jury determines that D(l) is 20 % at fault and D(2) is 80 %
at fault, both defendants having acted negligently. A judgment is rendered against both but
the judgment is satisfied by D(l) only. Assuming D(l) was entitled to pro rata contribution,
it would appear unjust for D(1) to bear half the burden of liability. Id.
51. See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 875(0 (vest Supp. 1989) (providing that enactment of
the Joint Judgment Statute shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing law, and
barring contribution where a right to indemnity exists). See Comment, Contribution and
Indemnity Collide with Comparative Negligence: The New Doctrine of Equitable Indemnity,
18 SANTA CLAA L. Rav. 779, 783 (1978).
Compare R.STATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886A (1979) (contribution among tortfeasors)
with RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886B (1979) (indemnity among tortfeasors). The
American Law Institute takes the position that contribution and indemnity are mutually
inconsistent remedies. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs § 886A(4) (1979) ("[w]hen one
tortfeasor has a right of indemnity against another, neither of them has a right of contribution
against the other"). See also RESTATEMENT (SEcoN) OF TORTS § 886A, comment 1 (1979)
("Indemnity, which shifts the entire loss from one tortfeasor to another, and contribution,
which shifts only a proportionate share of that loss, are mutually inconsistent remedies. When
there is a right of indemnity, it controls, and neither tortfeasor has a right of contribution
against the other").
52. See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text for a discussion of the difficulties in
determining culpability and rights to equitable indemnity.
53. See Herrero v. Atkinson, 227 Cal. App. 2d 69, 73, 38 Cal. Rptr. 490, 492 (1964)
(indemnity shifts entire loss while contribution equally distributes loss).
54. See American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 584, 578 P.2d
899, 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 (1978) (creating loss sharing between joint tortfeasors in
light of failure of Joint Judgment Statute to adequately apportion liability).
55. Id. at 583, 578 P.2d at 907, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 190.
56. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
(creating comparative fault in response to harsh contributory negligence rules).
57. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 583, 578 P.2d 899,
907, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 185 (1978) (recognizing loss sharing between joint tortfeasors).
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B. The Equitable Allocation of Fault and the Fairness Doctrine
The decision in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. replaced a system of
contributory negligence with a system of comparative fault,"S thus
providing a mechanism to assess the respective liability between
plaintiffs and defendants. 9 The Li court recognized that joint and
several liability6O and the existing doctrines of contribution 6' and
indemnity 62 might operate to defeat the new principle of apportioning
58. Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 813, 532 P.2d at 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864. In Li, the California
Supreme Court noted that the term "fault" merely meant "negligence." Id. However,
subsequent decisions which extended the concept of comparative fault to strict products liability
no longer restrict the use of the term "fault" to negligence. See Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-
Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); Daly v. General Motors Corp.,
20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
The California Supreme Court adopted a system of "pure" comparative negligence in which
liability is assessed in proportion to the respective fault of each of the parties. Li, 13 Cal. 3d
at 808, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861. The "pure" form of comparative negligence
involves assessment of liability in proportion to the fault of the parties without regard to
whether the plaintiff is equally or more at fault than the defendant. Id. at 808, 532 P.2d at
1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861. See also Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California
Legislature on Tort Liability on Problems Associated with American Motorcycle v. Superior
Court, 30 HAsTiNGs L.J. 1465, 1468-70 (1979) (discussing the various forms of comparative
negligence),
59. See Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 808, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861. The California
Supreme Court recognized the potential impact of its decision in Li on multiple defendant
tortfeasors. However, the court chose not to address the effect on multiple parties because the
issue was not specifically before the court. Id. at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
873.
60. See Adams, Settlements after Li: But is it "Fair?" 10 PAC. L.J. 729, 737-38 (1979)
(existence of joint and several liability in California results in conflicts between the fairness
principle of Li and the contribution statutes in California). The doctrine of joint and several
liability and the claim reduction provisions of section 877 force a nonsettling defendant whose
relative degree of fault is less than that of the settling tortfeasor to pay a portion of the
judgment greater than his equitable share of fault. Id. See also CAL. CrV. PRoC. CoDE § 877(a)
(Vest Supp. 1989) (claims against nonsettling tortfeasors reduced to the extent of the settlement
by settling defendants).
61. The California Joint Judgment Statute which apportioned liability among joint tort-
feasors on a pro rata basis operated mechanically to defeat the Li mandate of apportionment
of liability according to fault. See supra note 50 and accompanying text,
62. The existing doctrine of total equitable indemnity also operated to defeat the mandate
of the Li decisions to apportion liability according to fault. See Adams, Settlements After Li:
But is It "Fair?" 729, 738. In order for a joint defendant to be entitled to indemnity, he or
she must prove that their negligence was either passive or secondary. See supra notes 26-32
and accompanying text (discussing the entitlement to indemnity based on active/passive or
primary/secondary negligence). If the defendant could sustain that burden, then the entire loss
was shifted to the more culpable defendant. See supra notes 26-32 and accompanying text
(discussing total equitable indemnity). If the defendant failed to meet the burden that he or
she was the less culpable tortfeasor, then that defendant would bear the entire loss. Id. See
also Adams, supra at 738 (discussing failure of Li to deal with inequity of total equitable
indemnity).
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liability according to fault.6 However, the court in Li postponed
consideration of the doctrines of contribution, indemnity, and joint
and several liability because Li did not involve a multiple party
action. 64
The remedial inadequacies of the Joint Judgment Statute became
painfully clear in American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court.6 5
The Joint Judgment Statute would have left the Association without
redress by preventing the Association from joining the parents of the
injured plaintiff. 6 Consequently, the Association would be forced to
bear the parents' portion of negligence. In order to avoid the joint
judgment requirement and the procedural joinder difficulties, the
California Supreme Court held that joint and several liability should
be preserved67 and that the existing indemnity principles should be
63. See Li, 13 Cal. 3d at 823, 532 P.2d at 1239, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 87. The court stated
that multiple party cases presented difficult and uncertain issues with respect to its decision.
Id.
64. Id. at 826, 532 P.2d at 1241, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 873. See Comment, Loss Sharing
Among Contract Defendants: English Parts for the American Motorcycle, 12 PAc. L.J. 893,
898 (1981) (the California Supreme Court postponed re-evaluation of the doctrines in light of
comparative fault principles because it was presented with only a single party action).
65. American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 578 P.2d 899, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1978). In American Motorcycle, plaintiff, a teenage motorcycle racer, suffered
serious injuries in a cross-country motorcycle race for novices sponsored by defendants
American Motorcycle Association (AMA) and Viking Motorcycle Club (Viking). Id. at 584-
85, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185-86. Plaintiff sued AMA and Viking, alleging that
their negligent supervision and administration of the race proximately caused his injuries. Id.
AMA answered the complaint and sought leave to fie a cross-complaint against plaintiff's
parents alleging negligent supervision. Id. at 586, 578 P.2d at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186. The
cross complaint sought allocation of loss based on two theories: (1) AMA sought indemnity
based on the assertion that its negligence, if any, was "passive," while that of plaintiffs
parents was "active," thereby entitling AMA to indemnity; (2) AMA sought a declaration of
the "allocable negligence" of the parents in order that any damages awarded against AMA
might be reduced by the percentage of damages allocable to the parents' negligence. Id. AMA's
argument in this second respect was based on the assumption that Li abrogated the doctrine
of joint and several liability of concurrent tortfeasors and established a new rule. Id. Under
the new rule, each concurrent tortfeasor would be held liable only for that tortfeasor's portion
of the plaintiff's recovery, determined on a comparative fault basis. Id. at 586-87, 578 P.2d
at 903, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 186.
66. Id. at 605-6, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
67. The California Supreme Court enumerated four reasons why the doctrine of joint and
several liability should not be abrogated: (I) The simple feasibility of apportioning fault on a
comparative negligence basis does not render an indivisible injury "divisible" for purposes of
the joint and several liability rule (Id. at 589, 578 P.2d at 905-6, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189); (2)
the abandonment of joint and several liability is not warranted by the plaintiffs lack of
"innocence" after Li (Id.); (3) the relative culpability between a plaintiff and defendant are
not equal because a plaintiff's culpability relates to lack of due care in his own protection,
while a defendant's culpability relates to failure to exercise due care for others (Id. at 589-90,
578 P.2d at 905-6, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189); and (4) the policy underlying joint and several
liability which stresses full compensation to the victim often permits full recovery for his
injuries even when one or more of the responsible parties do not have the financial resources
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modified to permit loss sharing between joint tortfeasors under a
theory68 of "partial indemnity.'' 69 By creating loss sharing under a
partial indemnity theory, the procedural rules did not prevent the
Association from joining the parents via cross-complaint for partial
indemnity on a comparative fault basis. 70 Moreover, loss sharing
under partial indemnity allowed the court to avoid the joint judgment
requirement of the Joint Judgment Statute.7' Thus frustration with
to cover their liability (Id. at 590, 578 P.2d at 905-6, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 180) (citing Summers
v. Tice, 33 Cal. 2d 80, 88, 199 P.2d 1, 5 (1948) (wronged party should not be deprived of his
right to redress, but wrongdoers should be left to work out between themselves any appor-
tionment)).
68. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 600-02, 578 P.2d at 911, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 216-
17 (citing Dole v. Dow Chemical Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382
(1972)) (despite the apparent preclusion under California's Joint Judgment Statute of judicial
development of comparative contribution between joint tortfeasors, the Court followed the
course of other states by creating the theory of partial indemnity). In Dole, a widow sued
Dow, the manufacturer of a fumigant that caused the death of her husband. Dole v. Dow
Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 145.46, 282 N.E.2d 288, 290, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 384-85 (1972).
Dow sought full indemnification from the husband's employer. Id. at 146, 282 N.E.2d at 290,
331 N.Y.S.2d at 385. The court recognized that although the facts before the court might
merit apportionment between Dow and the employer, the existing New York contribution
scheme precluded contribution for anything but a pro rata share. Id. at 14748, 282 N.E.2d
at 291, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 386-87. Moreover, the all-or-nothing approach of the existing indemnity
doctrine lacked the flexibility desired by the court in apportioning liability. Id. at 148, 282
N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 387. Thus, believing that it was foreclosed from judicial
development of the contribution scheme and viewing indemnity as an inappropriate, inflexible
approach, the court allowed apportionment of liability under a theory of partial indemnity
based on the relative responsibility of the parties. Id. at 148-9, 282 N.E.2d at 292, 331 N.Y.S.2d
at 387.
69. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195. The
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B recognizes the constraints faced by the California
Supreme Court in American Motorcycle and the New York Court in Dole. One California
court of appeals addressed the issue of indemnity between joint tortfeasors prior to American
Motorcycle in the case of Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 132 Cal. Rptr.
843 (1976). In Stambaugh, petitioner Stambaugh caused another's death in a vehicle accident.
After settling with Stambaugh for the full amount of his insurance, the decedent's heirs sued
other alleged joint tortfeasors, including Pacific Gas & Electric Co. (PG&E). PG&E cross
complained against Stambaugh, arguing that Li required each contributing joint tortfeasor to
bear responsibility for his own share of fault. Disclaiming any purpose to seek indemnity or
contribution from Stambaugh, PG&E sought to join Stambaugh so that the finder of fact
could better determine PG&E's proportionate share of total liability. The Court of Appeals
held that in light of the strong policy favoring settlement of disputes, a joint tortfeasor who
has settled in good faith with the plintiff is "forever discharged of further obligation to the
claimant, and to his joint tortfeasors by way of contribution or otherwise." Id. at 235, 132
Cal. Rptr. at 844-46.
70. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 605-6, 578 P.2d at 916-17, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
Since the California Supreme Court had earlier held that a named defendant could implead
an unnamed defendant for indemnity in Roylance v. Doelger, 57 Cal. 2d 255, 368 P.2d 535,
19 Cal. Rptr. 7 (1962), the court held that the procedural rules did not prevent joinder of
parties for a claim for loss sharing under a theory of partial indemnity. American Motorcycle,
20 Cal. 3d at 605-6, 578 P.2d at 917, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
71. The court explained that where total indemnity was inappropriate and contribution
was not allowed because a joint judgment had not been rendered, the law inequitably leaves
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the Joint Judgment Statute led the California Supreme Court to
utilize comparative fault principles between joint tortfeasors in the
form of partial indemnity. However, the judicial creation of loss
sharing in American Motorcycle was actually contribution under a
different label.
2
The decision in American Motorcycle altered the settlement prac-
tices under the Joint Judgment Statute. The court expanded the
settlement rules under the Joint Judgment Statute to preclude claims
from joint tortfeasors for partial or comparative indemnity. 73 Further,
a judgment against nonsettling defendants is not diminished by the
settling tortfeasors' pro rata responsibility, 4 but instead is given pro
tanto effect.
75
The court in American Motorcycle balanced several competing
settlement policies. The policy of maximizing the recovery to the
injured party justified both the retention of joint and several liability
76
and the rejection of the pro rata reduction of plaintiff's judgment
upon settlement by joint tortfeasor.7 The policy of encouraging
settlement of the injured party's claim justified the expansion of the
doctrine which barred claims for contribution against good faith
settling tortfeasors .7  Finally, the policy of fair and equitable appor-
the parties without redress. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 597-98, 578 P.2d at 910-11,
146 Cal. Rptr. at 193-4.
72. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 886B, comment m (1979). Under the heading of
"Contribution," the American Law Institute explains that some courts, frustrated by contri-
bution statutes, created the theory of partial indemnity by declaring that indemnity is an
equitable doctrine judicially developed and subject to further development for the purposes of
attaining justice. Id.
73. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 604-5, 578 P.2d at 913-915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at
198.
74. Note that a subsequent court did adopt this view. See Baget v. Shepard, 128 Cal.
App. 3d 433, 180 Cal. Rptr. 396 (1982). However, Baget was officially decertified by the
California Supreme Court pursuant to CAL. R. CT. § 976(d), and can not be cited as authority.
75. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 605, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 199.
See supra note 45 (defining pro tanto). The plaintiff's recovery from the nonsettling tortfeasors
should be diminished only by the amount that the plaintiff has actually recovered in a good
faith settlement. Id.
76. Id. at 590, 578 P.2d at 906, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 189. See Comment, Contribution and
Indemnity Collide with Comparative Negligence-The New Doctrine of Equitable Indemnity,
18 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 779, 788-801 (1978) (discussing the conflict between the common
law rules of joint and several liability and the doctrine of comparative negligence).
77. See Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity Under Comparative Negligence: Anomaly
or Necessity?, 74 CALrF. L. REv. 1057, 1078 (1986) (court's rejection of a pro rata reduction
of plaintiff's judgment presumably reflects the primacy of the policy favoring full recovery of
the plaintiff over the equitable allocation of liability).
78. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 603-4, 578 P.2d at 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198-
99 (citing Stambaugh v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 231, 236, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 846
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tionment of liability among joint tortfeasors justified the adoption
of loss sharing between joint tortfeasors on a comparative fault
basis.
79
Despite the judicial utilization of loss sharing to ascertain percen-
tages of fault between joint tortfeasors, the California Supreme Court
left unanswered the fate of total indemnity, or the total shifting of
loss.80 In Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart,8' the California Supreme
Court held that loss sharing principles should be applied to apportion
liability between a strictly liable defendant and a negligent defen-
dant, 12 but expressly reserved the question whether the loss sharing
principles under American Motorcycle should be applied in situations
where the liability of a party is entirely derivative or vicarious.83
(1976) (lack of fimality of judgments will discourage settlement)). Courts before and after the
decision in American Motorcycle have recognized the conflict between the two policies of
encouraging settlements and of equitable allocation of fault among joint tortfeasors. See, e.g.,
Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 504, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825, 829 (1984); River
Garden Farms v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. App. 3d 986, 997, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498, 506 (1972).
79. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 584, 578 P.2d at 902, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 185.
Subsequent cases placed the policies underlying the decision in American Motorcycle in a
hierarchy. See Sears Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147
Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978) (first is maximization of recovery to the injured party; second is
encouragement of settlement of the injured party's claim; third is the equitable apportionment
of liability among the tortfeasors); accord Teachers Ins. Co. v. Smith, 128 Cal. App. 3d 862,
180 Cal. Rptr. 701 (1982). Thus, since the fairness doctrine had been enumerated in Li, it was
subjected to third place in the hierarchy of competing policies which determine the allocation
of fault among joint tortfeasors. Compare Li v. Yellow Cab, Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 813, 532
P.2d 1226, 1232, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 864 (1974) (principle objective is to establish a system
under which liability for damage is borne by those whose negligence cause it in direct proportion
to their respective fault) with Sears Roebuck & Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal.
App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978) (tertiary objective is equitable allocation of fault
among joint tortfeasors).
80. See Comment, Indemnity in California: Is it Really Equitable after American Motor-
cycle and Section 877.6? 18 PAC. L.J. 201, 212 (1986) (American Motorcycle did not expressly
abandon total equitable indemnity).
81. Safeway Stores v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978).
Safeway Stores involved a personal injury action for a foot injury caused by a shopping cart.
Id. The jury in found that the manufacturer's liability rested on strict liability and the
supermarket's liability rested on negligent maintenance of equipment. Id. at 325-26, 579 P.2d
at 442-43, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 551. The trial court concluded that apportionment on a comparative
fault basis was not permissible under existing law and consequently ordered a pro rata
apportionment of liability. Id.
82. Unlike American Motorcycle, the defendants in Safeway Stores were joint judgment
debtors and subject to the apportionment rules of section 875 of the California Code of Civil
Procedure. Safeway Stores, 21 Cal. 3d at 327 n.2, 579 P.2d at 443 n.2, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 552
n.2. However, the court allowed apportionment under the common law principles of compar-
ative negligence enumerated in American Motorcycle. Id. at 328, 579 P.2d at 444, 146 Cal.
Rptr. at 553 (citing American Motorcycle 20 Cal. 3d at 591-99, 578 P.2d at 907-912, 143 Cal.
Rptr. at 189-95).
83. Safeway Stores, 21 Cal. 3d at 332 n.5, 579 P.2d at 446 n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555
n.5. The court explained:
In the instant case, the jury found that Safeway was itself negligent in failing to
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However, in People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior
Court,4 the California Supreme Court explained that American Mo-
torcycle had simply modified the existing indemnity principles and
did not create a new action for indemnity.8 5 The court held that a
defendant who could not be sued directly because of the expiration
of the statute of limitations could be sued by other defendants in a
subsequent action for indemnity.86 Various courts and commentators
cited the decisions in Safeway Stores and People ex rel. Department
of Transportation regarding the existence of total equitable indemnity
after American Motorcycle.
87
safely maintain its carts, and thus Safeway's liability is in no sense solely derivative
or vicarious. Accordingly, we have no occasion to determine in this case whether
the comparative indemnity doctrine should be applied in a situation in which a
party's liability is entirely derivative or vicarious in nature (citations omitted).
Id.
84. People ex rel. Department of Transp. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 711, 608 P.2d
673, 163 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1980). In People ex rel. Department of Transp., plaintiff, injured in
an automobile accident on a public highway, sued a number of individuals, but did not file
a timely claim against the state pursuant to the Tort Claims Act (Cal. Gov't Code §§ 810-
996.6). Id. at 747, 608 P.2d at 625, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 587. Several of the defendants filed a
claim for partial equitable indemnity against the state, alleging the state's negligence in blocking
off lanes of traffic proximately caused the plaintiff's injuries. Id.
85, Id. at 756-57, 608 P.2d at 681, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 592-3.
86. Id. The court explained that an action for indemnity is independent of the plaintiff's
cause of action and accrues only when the tort defendant has suffered actual loss through
payment. Id. at 749, 608 P.2d at 676, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 588.
87. Compare Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 914, 920, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 224, 228-29 (Cal. App. 4th Dist. 1987) reh'g granted 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66
(1987) remanded by Supreme Court 763 P.2d 479, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988) (the court
explained that the restraint exercised in Safeway Stores is enough to evidence the continued
viability of total indemnity, despite Tech-Bilt's silence as to whether total indemnity could be
extinguished by a good faith settlement); Angelus Assocs. Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods.,
Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985) (Safeway Stores is evidence that
American Motorcycle may not have abolished common law total indemnity); Huizar v. Abex
Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984) (decision in Safeway Stores shows that
American Motorcycle did not abolish common law indemnity); with Far West Fin. Corp. v.
D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 807, 760 P.2d 399, 251 Cal. Rptr. 202 (1988) (the language in
the footnote provides only "oblique support" for the contention that the total indemnity
doctrine survived American Motorcycle); IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 106,
224 Cal. Rptr. 438, 444 (1986) (despite language in Safeway Stores, dilemmas facing counsel
wishing to settle gives rise to the need to encompass total indemnity in comparative or partial
indemnity); City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 876, 171 Cal. Rptr.
764 (1981) (despite decision in Safeway Stores, partial indemnity encompasses total indemnity).
See also Comment, Indemnity in California: Is it Really Equitable After American Motorcycle
and Section 877.6? 18 PAC. L.J. 201, 227-28 (1986) (language in Safeway Stores presumably
indicates the survival of total indemnity after American Motorcycle); Comment, Total Equitable
Indemnity: Can it Pierce a Pretrial Settlement? 20 Loy. L.A.L. Rav. 99, 128-29 (1986)
(subsequent opinions such as Safeway Stores indicate that American Motorcycle did not abolish
total equitable indemnity).
Compare, e.g., White v. City of Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 376, 187 Cal.
Rptr. 879, 885 (1982) (American Motorcycle and People ex rel. Dept. of Transp. indicate that
the indemnity doctrine was merely modified to allow partial indemnity in appropriate cases,
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C. California Civil Procedure Code section 877.6
In 1980, despite critical commentary,88 the California Legislature
codified the holding of American Motorcycle by enacting California
Civil Procedure Code section 877.6(c). 8 9 Section 877.6, like the de-
cision in American Motorcycle, bars claims for contribution or partial
or comparative indemnity after a good faith settlement by a joint
tortfeasor.90 The adoption of the exact language of the decision in
American Motorcycle, however, resulted in two problems: the defi-
nition of a good faith settlement 9' and the continued existence of
total indemnity. 92
not to eliminate the concept of total equitable indemnity in appropriate cases) with Standard
Pac. of San Diego v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 586-87, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106
(1986) (based on the explicit language in American Motorcycle and the explanation in People
ex rel. Dept. of Transp., the comparative indemnity doctrine is not separate and distinct from
the common law doctrine of total indemnity). Thus, comparative equitable indemnity includes
the entire range of possible apportionments, from no right to any indemnity to a right of total
indemnity. Id.
88. See, e.g., Englard, Li v. Yellow Cab Co. A Belated and Inglorious Centennial of the
California Civil Code, 65 CAxir. L. REv. 4, 22-27 (1977) (court's analysis of historical basis
is inaccurate).
89. CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1989) (good faith settlement bars claims
by other joint tortfeasors against the settling tortfeasor for "equitable comparative contribution,
or partial or comparative indemnity").
The legislature enacted section 877.6 to provide for a hearing on the issue of good faith of
a settlement entered into by the plaintiff. See Review of Selected 1980 California Legislation,
12 PAc. L.J. 290, 290-91 (1980). Section 877.6 was in apparent response to Fisher v. Superior
Court, 103 Cal. App. 3d 434, 163 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1980) (holding issue of good faith should be
tried separately and in advance of the trial of tort issues). See CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE §
877.6(a) (West Supp. 1989) (any joint tortfeasor is entitled to a hearing on good faith of
settlement entered into by another joint tortfeasor with the plaintiff).
90. Compare CAL. Crv. PROC. CODE § 877.6(c) (West Supp. 1989) with American Mo-
torcycle Ass'n v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 603-4, 578 P.2d. 899, 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr.
182, 198-199 (1978).
On June 3, 1986, the California voters drastically altered the concept of joint and several
liability by approving the Fair Responsibility Act of 1986 (popularly known as "Proposition
51" or "The Deep Pocket Initiative"). Proposition 51 retains joint and several liability for
economic damages, but makes liability for non-economic damages several. CAL. Civ. CODE §
1431.2(a) (West Supp. 1989). Economic damages are those "objectively verifiable monetary
losses including medical expenses, loss of earnings, burial costs, loss of use of property, costs
of repair or replacement, costs of obtaining substitute domestic services, loss of employment
and loss of business or employment opportunities." CAL. CIV. CODE § 1431.2(b)(1) (West
Supp. 1989). Non-economic damages are those "subjective, non-monetary losses including, but
not limited to, pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental suffering, emotional distress, loss of
society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputation and humiliation." CAL.
Civ. CODE § 1431.2(b)(2) (West Supp. 1989).
91. See Roberts, The "Good Faith" Settlement: An Accommodation of Competing Goals,
17 Loy. L.A.L. Ray. 841, 855-58 (1984) (review of conflicting criteria to test the good faith
of a settlement).
92. See CAL. CODE Cirv. PROC. § 877 (West Supp. 1989).
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1. Good Faith Settlements under section 877.6
A pretrial settlement pursuant to section 877.6(c) which is not in
good faith does not bar claims for contribution or indemnity. 93
Without guidance from either the legislature or the California Su-
preme Court as to what constitutes a "good faith" settlement, the
lower courts focused on either the absence of tortious or collusive
conduct between the settling tortfeasor and the plaintiff,94 or whether
the settlement was within the reasonable range95 of the potential
liability of the settling tortfeasor. 96 The California Supreme Court
eventually provided guidelines as to what constitutes a good faith
settlement in Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Associates.
97
In Tech-Bilt, the court rejected the "tortious or collusive conduct"
test as the exclusive criteria for "good faith" and adopted the
"reasonable range" test. 98 The court explained that the reasonable
range requirement, coupled with a requirement of good faith in the
dismissal of the claim, furthered the policies underlying section 877:
encouragement of settlement and equitable allocation of fault between
joint tortfeasors.9 The court placed a heavy burden on those chal-
93. See CAL. CrV. PROC. CODE §§ 877, 877.6(c) (Vest Supp. 1989) (settlement must be in
good faith).
94. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Schultz, 147 Cal. App. 3d 941, 950, 195 Cal. Rptr.
470, 475 (1983) (absent collusion, a joint tortfeasor should be permitted to negotiate settlement
of an adverse claim according to his or her own best interests); Burlington Northern R.R. Co.
v. Superior Court, 137 Cal. App. 3d 942, 945, 187 Cal. Rptr. 376, 378 (1982) (requirement
of good faith is meant to insure that the settling parties do not tortiously injure the nonsettling
parties); Dompeling v. Superior Court, 117 Cal. App. 3d 798, 809-10, 173 Cal. Rptr. 38, 44-
45 (1981) (bad faith not established by mere showing that settling tortfeasor paid less than
fair or proportionate share); Cardio Systems v. Superior Court, 122 Cal. App. 3d 880, 890
176 Cal. Rptr. 254 (1981) (reversing trial court's refusal to dismiss despite absence of collusion,
concealment, or sinister motive).
95. See, e.g., Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825, 831
(1984) ("good faith" requires that the price of a defendant's settlement bear some relationship
to the merits and values of the case against that defendant); accord Owen v. United States,
713 F.2d 1461 (9th Cir. 1983); accord River Garden Farms, Inc. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal.
App. 3d 986, 103 Cal. Rptr. 498 (1972).
96. See Roberts, The "Good Faith" Settlement: An Accommodation of Competing Goals,
17 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 841, 855-58 (1984) (exhaustive review of conflicting criteria to test the
good faith of a settlement).
97. Tech-Bilt v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal.
Rptr. 256 (1985). See generally, Mishky, Tessier, and Vastano, California Code of Civil
Procedure Sections 877, 877.5, and 877.6: The Settlement Game in the Ballpark that Tech-
Bilt, 13 PEPPERDINE L. Rav. 823, (1985) (stating that the decision in Tech-Bilt is a step in the
right direction on the path towards fairness for all litigants).
98. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
99. Id. at 497, 698 P.2d at 164-65, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 261-62 (quoting Commercial Union
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lenging the good faith of a settlement '00 by requiring a challenging
party to show that the settlement amount was "so far out of the
ballpark" as to be inconsistent with the objectives of the good faith
requirement.101
2. Total Indemnity after section 877.6
After the decision in American Motorcycle and the enactment of
section 877.6, the Courts of Appeal divided over whether a good
faith settlement by a joint tortfeasor barred subsequent claims for
total indemnity by vicariously or derivatively liable defendants.10 The
theoretical underpinnings of the dispute lay in the confusion over
whether American Motorcycle involved contribution and left equi-
table indemnity intact, or whether American Motorcycle merged the
concepts of contribution and indemnity. Some courts and commen-
tators argued that a good faith settlement barred claims for total
equitable indemnity.0 3 Other courts and commentators supported the
Ins. Co. v. Ford Motor Co., 640 F.2d 210, 213 (9th Cir. 1980) cert. denied, 454 U.S. 858
(1981)). The court explained that the amount of the settlement is relevant in determining good
faith and must be equitable in light of the following factors: (1) A rough approximation of
plaintiff's total recovery and the settlor's proportionate liability; (2) the allocation of settlement
proceeds among plaintiffs; (3) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than
he would have if he were found liable after a trial; (4) financial conditions, including insurance
policy limits; and (5) any indications of fraud, collusion, or tortious conduct aimed to injure
the interests of the non-settling defendants. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at
263-64.
100. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
101. Id. at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
102. Zarback v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 3d 120, 240 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1987) reh'g
granted 746 P.2d 451, 242 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1987) remanded by Supreme Court 763 P.2d 479,
252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988). A split also developed among the Courts of Appeal with regard to
whether an indemnity claim resting on an implied contractual indemnity theory is barred by
a good faith settlement. Compare, e.g., IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 109-
110, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438, 446-447 (1986) (claim for total indemnity based on implied contractual
indemnity theory barred by good faith settlement); accord County of L.A. v. Superior Court;
Stratton v. Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., 190 Cal. App. 3d 286, 292, 235 Cal. Rptr. 374
(1987); Kramer v. Cedu Found., Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552 (1979)
(implied contractual indemnity replaced by American Motorcycle principles of implied equitable
comparative negligence); with County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 155 Cal. App. 3d
798, 803 (1984) (claim for total indemnity based on implied contractual indemnity theory not
barred by good faith settlement); accord Bear Creek Planning Comm'n v. Title Ins. & Trust
Co., 164 Cal. App. 3d 1227, 1239, 211 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1985).
103. See Zarback v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 3d 120, 240 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1987)
reh'g granted 746 P.2d 451, 242 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1987) remanded by Supreme Court 763 P.2d
479, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988) (good faith settlement bars subsequent claim for total indemnity);
accord Horton v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 727, 238 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1987); In re
Nucorp Energy Sec. Litigation, 661 F. Supp. 1403 (S.D.Cal. 1987) (federal court sitting In
diversity holding that good faith settlement bars subsequent claim for total indemnity); IRM
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continued existence of the right to total indemnity by vicariously or
derivatively liable defendants.'04
a. Good Faith Settlement Forecloses a Claim for Total
Equitable Indemnity
Analytically, the cases holding that a good faith settlement bars
subsequent claims for total indemnity can be divided between those
in which the court found rights to total indemnity did not exist'05
and those in which the court found that traditional rights to indemnity
did exist.? 6 The seminal case in the first category, City of Sacramento
v. Gemsch Investment Co.,107 held that the doctrine of partial indem-
Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 92, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438 (1986) (good faith settlement bars
subsequent claim for total indemnity); accord Standard Pac. of San Diego v. A.A. Baxter
Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1986); Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157
Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984); Lopez v. Blecher, 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 192
Cal. Rptr. 190 (1983); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1983); Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal. Rptr.
580 (1983); City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr.
764 (1981) (total indemnity subsumed in comparative fault inquiry and is barred by good faith
settlement). See also Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity Under Comparative Negligence:
Anomaly or Necessity? 74 CAuiH. L. REv. 1057 (1986) (the doctrine of total indemnity should
be subsumed under the doctrine of comparative indemnity and good faith settlements should
bar all cross-complaints for indemnity, both total and partial).
104. See Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 914, 915, 236 Cal. Rptr.
224, 225 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1987) reh'g granted 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1987)
remanded by Supreme Court 763 P.2d 479, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988) (cross-complaint for
total indemnity survives a cross-defendant's good faith settlement); Hale v. Laden, 178 Cal.
App. 3d 668, 674, 224 Cal. Rptr. 182, 184 (1986) (claim for total indemnity barred by good
faith settlement because codefendant could allege no facts entitling him to total indemnity);
Angelus Associates Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 534, 213
Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985) (nonsettling defendant retailer in a products liability action may pursue
a cross-complaint for total equitable indemnity despite good faith settlement); Huizar v. Abex
Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 541, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47, 51 (1984) (doctrine of total or equitable
indemnity not abolished by American Motorcycle); E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington
Beach, 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 377-78, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879, 886 (1982) (good faith settlement
not a bar to claim for total indemnity). See also Comment, Indemnity in California: Is it
Really Equitable After American Motorcycle and Section 877.6? 18 PAC. L.J. 201, (1986)
(right to total indemnity continues to exist despite good faith settlement); Comment, Total
Equitable Indemnity: Can it Pierce a Pretrial Settlement? 20 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 99 (1986)
(right total indemnity survives good faith pretrial settlements).
105. See, e.g., Torres v. Union Pac..R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825
(1984); Lopez v. Blecher, 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 192 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1983); Turcon Constr.,
Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1983); City of
Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981).
106. See, e.g., Standard Pac. of San Diego v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577,
222 Cal. Rptr. 106 (1986); Kohn v. Superior Court, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78
(1983).
107. City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764
(1981).
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
nity absorbed the concept of total equitable indemnity.' 0' In Gemsch,
the city brought a claim for total indemnity against a landowner
after both were joined as defendants in a personal injury suit. ' 9 The
plaintiff sustained injuries in a fall on the sidewalk adjacent to the
property of the landowner." 0 The plaintiff sued the city as the owner
of an easement over the sidewalk and the landowner on the basis of
a statutory duty to maintain the sidewalk."' The city filed a cross-
complaint for total indemnity based on a theory of "implied con-
tract" between the city and landowner." 2 The trial court denied the
claim by the city for total indemnity."3 In affirming the decision of
the trial court, the Court of Appeals for the Third District rejected
the argument by the city that the decision in American Motorcycle
did not repudiate the total equitable indemnity theory." 4 The court
explained that fault on the part of the city barred a claim for
indemnity and traditional notions of indemnity did not relieve the
city from liability." 5
108. Id. at 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
109. Id. at 871, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 765.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 872-73, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 765-66.
112. Id. at 873, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 765-66.
113. Id. at 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768.
114. Id. The court stated that American Motorcycle "did not expressly repudiate the
concept of equitable indemnity where the alleged indemnitor's negligence versus the indemnitee's
fault was passive/active, negative/positive, or secondary/primary." Id. at 875-76, 171 Cal.
Rptr. at 767.
The court stated three bases for its decision. First, the lack of finality in allowing a continued
right of indemnity would discourage settlements. Id. at 876-77, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768. A
settling defendant would face further litigation in order to determine liability to nonsettling
codefendants for total indemnity. Id. Second, there was no evident equity in favor of allowing
the city to recover full indemnity. Id. The city had a separate, but concurrent duty to trim or
remove the trees and otherwise prevent a dangerous condition of which it had notice. Id. The
court employed the pre-American Motorcycle terms and found the city's conduct primary, but
passive. Id. at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768. Consequently, the court, noting the apparent
contradiction in terms, rejected the use of the active/passive-primary/secondary distinctions
and denied the City's claim for indemnity. Id. at 876, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768. Finally, the
court stated that section 877, broadly and equitably interpreted, includes tortfeasors who are
passive/negative/secondary. Id. Courts have generally refused to narrowly construe California
Civil Procedure Code sections 877 and 877.6. Comment, Total Equitable Indemnity: Can it
Pierce a Pretrial Settlement? 20 Loy. L.A.L. REv. 99, 118 n.1O0 (1986).
115. Gemsch, 115 Cal. App. 3d at 877, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 768. While appearing to reject
total indemnity altogether, the court left open the issue of total indemnity where the indemnitee
is without fault or negligence. Id. Absent fault on the part of the City, the court referred to
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 886B for examples of when total indemnity would lie.
Id. Restatement (Second) of Torts section 886B, comment j provides:
The duty to protect the indemnitee from liability may arise under a contract or be
imposed by statute or the common law. A typical example arises when a landowner
allows a sidewalk to fall into disrepair and is required to indemnify the city when
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Decisions subsequent to the enactment of section 877.6 cite Gemsch
for the proposition that the new doctrine of comparative or partial
indemnity absorbed total indemnity concepts of primary/secondary
negligence and active/passive negligence,"16 despite the fact that Gemsch
was decided before the enactment of section 877.6. 17 The Court of
Appeals for the Second District held in Turcon Construction, Inc.
v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd.118 that under section 877.6, the doctrine of
it becomes liable for injury to a pedestrian.
RESTATEMBENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS § 886B, comment j (1977).
The dissent in Gemsch disagreed as to the fate of total equitable indemnity after American
Motorcycle. City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 878, 171 Cal.
Rptr. 764, 769 (1981) (Paras, J. dissenting). The dissent explained that American Motorcycle
merely modified the existing equitable indemnity doctrine and that equitable indemnity was a
separate and distinct concept from that of comparative indemnity. Id. Consequently, the dissent
argued that total equitable indemnity should not be foreclosed by a "good faith" settlement.
Id. at 879, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 769.
116. See, e.g., Kohn v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191
Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983) (total indemnity absorbed by comparative or partial indemnity); accord
Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580
(1983); Lopez v. Blecher, 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 192 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1983) (Court of Appeals
for the Fourth District held that in light of statutory policy encouraging settlements, a good
faith settlement under section 877.6 bars claims for total indemnity). See also Comment, Total
Equitable Indemnity: Can it Pierce a Pretrial Settlement? 20 Loy. L.A.L. Rv. 99, 119 (1986)
(Gemsch mysteriously miscited as authority for proposition that all forms of indemnity are
barred by American Motorcycle and section 877.6). See generally Angelus Assocs. v. Neonex
Leisure Prods., Inc., 162 Cal. App. 3d 532, 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 407 (1985) (Lopez did
not address the issue of a claim for total indemnity against a settling tortfeasor).
117. See City of Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 873 n.1, 171
Cal. Rptr. 764, 766-67 n.1 (1981) (issue of total indemnity decided solely on the basis of the
decision in American Motorcycle and section 877).
118. Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal. Rptr.
580 (1983). In Turcon, a motorcycle driver who was severely injured in a collision with an
automobile brought suit against the automobile driver and the companies allegedly liable for
the defective manufacture of the motorcycle and its gas tank. Id. at 281-82, 188 Cal. Rptr. at
581. Turcon Construction, the owner and operator of the vehicle, cross-complained against
Norton-Villiers, et al., manufacturers of the motorcycle and its component parts for indemnity
and/or contribution. Id. at 281, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 581. The plaintiff first settled with Turcon
Construction and later with the other defendants (Norton-Villiers, et. al). Id. Norton-Villiers
moved to set aside the cross-complaint on the basis that their good faith settlement pursuant
to Code of Civil Procedure section 877.6 barred further actions for indemnity or contribution.
Id. The trial court granted the motion and Turcon Construction appealed. Id. at 282, 188
Cal. Rptr. at 581-82.
On appeal, Turcon Construction based its complaint for indemnity on two grounds: First,
Turcon Construction was not a "joint tortfeasor" because it was a concurrent or successive
tortfeasor and as such was not barred from pursuing its claim for indemnity by section 877.6;
second, Turcon Construction's conduct was only passive/secondary vis-a-vis Norton-Villiers'.
Id. at 283-84, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83. As to the first ground, the court held Turcon was a
joint tortfeasor within the meaning of section 877.6. Id. As to the second ground, although
Turcon couched the complaint in traditional total indemnity terms, Turcon was in substance
seeking indemnity on a partial or comparative fault basis. Id. at 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 582-
83. The court explained that the claim by the indemnitee contained no allegations which could
provide the basis for a shifting of total liability to the indemnitor. Id. See supra notes 17-32
and accompanying text for traditional basis for shifting total liability between joint tortfeasors.
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comparative or partial indemnity subsumed the doctrine of total
indemnity. Despite a finding that no indemnity rights existed," 9 the
court ruled that absent contractual indemnity' 20 a good faith settle-
ment pursuant to section 877.6 barred the claim by the indemnitee
for total indemnity.1
2'
In Kohn v. Superior Court, the Court of Appeals for the First
District decided a case in which a traditional right to indemnity
existed between successive tortfeasors. 2 2 The court cited the holdings
of Gemsch and Turcon for the proposition that a good faith settle-
ment barred all forms of indemnity between joint tortfeasors 2 1 The
court stated that absent express contractual indemnity rights,'2 the
119. Turcon, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83 (the claim by the indemnitee
contained no allegations which could provide the basis for a shifting of total liability to the
indemnitor). See supra notes 17-32 and accompanying text for traditional basis for shifting
total liability between joint tortfeasors.
120. See IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 106, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438, 444 (1986)
(Turcon left open the door to cross-complaints based on contractual indemnity or to those
where liability of a cross-complaint to the plaintiff is imposed solely as a matter of law because
of the relationship with the settling tortfeasor).
121. Turcon, 139 Cal. App. 3d at 284, 188 Cal. Rptr. at 582-83.
122. Kohn v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1983). Kohn involved an action by home buyers against a real estate broker and a
construction company for fraud in failing to disclose structural defects caused by a prior fire.
Id. at 325-26, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 80. The real estate broker cross-complained against the
construction company for total or partial indemnity. Id. When the construction company
settled with the plaintiff, the court dismissed the cross-complaint. Id.
The Court of Appeals for the First District, citing Gemsch, upheld the dismissal of the
cross-complaint. Id. at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83. The court, approving of the expansion in
the Turcon decision of the meaning of the term "joint tortfeasor," rejected petitioner's
argument that they were not "joint tortfeasors" within the meaning of section 877. Id. at
328-29, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 82-83. The court explained that although the alleged fraud and the
alleged failure to repair or inspect occurred on different dates, they combined to create an
indivisible injury which took place when the sale of the house was consummated. Id. See
Blecker v. Wolbart, 167 Cal. App. 3d 1195, 1202-3, 213 Cal. Rptr. 781, 784-85 (1935)
(comparative indemnity doctrine of American Motorcycle, although dealing factually only with
concurrent tortfeasors, also applies to successive tortfeasors). See also RESTATEtrENT (SECOND)
oF TORTS § 886B(e) (1977) (right to indemnity exists where indemnitor creates a dangerous
condition on land as a result of which both were liable to the third person, and the indemnitee
innocently or negligently failed to discover a defect). Consequently, the pre-trial dismissal of
the claim for total indemnity denied the indemnitee-broker the opportunity to litigate the issue
of fault and equitably allocate loss.
123. Kohn v. Superior Court of San Mateo County, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1983).
124. Id. at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83 (petitioners failed to assert express contractual
indemnity rights). The court was careful to explain that it addressed only the issue of implied
equitable indemnity based on tort theories, because the petitioner had failed to properly present
the issue of implied contractual indemnity to the trial court. Id. at 330 n.3, 191 Cal. Rptr. at
83 n.3. The court explained that petitioners' claim for "implied" contractual indemnity rights
failed under Kramer v. Cedu Foundation, Inc., 93 Cal. App. 3d 1, 12, 155 Cal. Rptr. 552,
558 (1979) which held that American Motorcycle's principles of implied equitable comparative
indemnity replaced the doctrine of implied contractual indemnity. Id. at 330 n.3, 191 Cal.
Rptr. at 83 n.3.
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trial court, having found good faith in the settlement, had no basis
for permitting the continued prosecution of the cross-complaint for
indemnity. 12
In Standard Pacific of San Diego v. A.A. Baxter Corporation,'26
the Court of Appeal for the Fourth District denied a claim for total
indemnity against a settling tortfeasor by a party whose legal re-
sponsibilities were derivative or vicarious. 127 The court found three
bases for concluding that the claim by petitioner for total indemnity
should be denied.12s First, the court disapproved of the line of cases
holding that the comparative indemnity principles of section 877.6
were separate and distinct from the common law doctrine of total
indemnification. 129 The court explained that distinctions between total
indemnity and comparative negligence are artificial because both are
simply methods of equitably allocating or apportioning loss. 30 Con-
sequently, the court held that comparative indemnity includes the
entire spectrum of possible apportionments, from no right to any
indemnity to a right of complete indemnity. 3' Second, the court held
that section 877.6 protects vicariously or derivatively liable defendants
by requiring that the settlement be in good faith. 3 2 Under the
standard enumerated in Tech-Bilt, one who is nearly factually inno-
cent and one whose liability is imposed as a matter of public policy
are similarly situated and the law should act to bar subsequent claims
125. Id. at 330, 191 Cal. Rptr. at 83.
126. Standard Pac. of San Diego v. A.A. Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 222 Cal.
Rptr. 106 (1986).
127. Id. In Baxter, a group of homeowners sued the builders and retailers of their homes,
the contractors who had done the grading and compacting of the soil, and the original
landowner for damages to their homes resulting from a soil subsidence. Id. at 580-81, 222
Cal. Rptr. at 107. The contractors settled with the homeowner-plaintiffs, and sought a
determination by the trial court that subsequent claims for total indemnity should be dismissed.
Id. at 581, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 107. Based on the good faith of the settlement, the trial court
dismissed the development company's indemnity claim. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 586-87, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 110-12 (citing for example Angelus Assocs. Corp. v.
Neonex Leisure Prods., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985)). See infra notes
141-186 and accompanying text for discussion of cases which hold that total equitable indemnity
survives American Motorcycle.
130. Baxter, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 587, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12. However, the court
neglected to discuss that although both the doctrines of total indemnity and comparative
negligence operate to equitably allocate or apportion loss among joint tortfeasors, the former
operates equitably to shift the entire loss to the responsible party, while the latter operates
equitably to share responsibility between jointly responsible parties. See supra notes 52-54 and
accompanying text.
131. Baxter, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 587, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 111-12.
132. Id. at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
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for indemnification after a good faith settlement. 33 The court indi-
cated that the approach under Tech-Bilt balances the competing
policies of equitable allocation of fault and the encouragement of
settlements. 34 Finally, the court concluded that vicarious or derivative
tortfeasors are "joint tortfeasors" within the meaning of section
877.6.13 The court held that the term "joint tortfeasor" should be
extended to include those innocent of wrongdoing but who have
liability imposed for purposes of public policy.'3 6
The earlier cases of Gemsch and Turcon involved situations in
which traditionally, the party seeking indemnity could not allege facts
sufficient to show rights to total indemnity. Gemsch and Turcon
reached the conclusion that the tortfeasors were seeking partial or
comparative indemnity based on their own comparative negligence
or their lack of legal relationship. 37 Consequently, the courts dis-
missed the indemnity claims, which were barred in the face of a
good faith settlement. Nevertheless, the courts expanded American
Motorcycle and section 877.6 to subsume total indemnity.
Kohn and Baxter and their progeny, on the other hand, balance
the competing interests of encouraging settlement and equitably al-
locating loss among joint tortfeasors.'3 1 These cases explained that
133. Id. at 580, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 107. The court reasoned that a vicariously liable
defendant whose liability is based on public policy is similarly situated to a defendant who is
nearly factually innocent. Id. at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13. The court found incongruous
an interpretation of section 877.6 allowing one who might be one percent liable to be barred
from further indemnification while allowing one who is factually innocent but vicariously liable
a surviving right to full indemnity. Id.
See also Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825 (1984)
(although recognizing exceptions to the interpretation which barred total equitable indemnity,
the Court of Appeals for the Second District held that the broad definition of good faith
under Tech-Bilt mandates that all cases of indemnity, partial or total, should be subject to
sections 877 and 877.6). But see Comment, Indemnity in California: Is it Really Equitable
After American Motorcycle and Section 877.6? 18 PAc. L.J. 201, 222-23 (1986) (Torres did
not abolish total indemnity).
134. Baxter, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 589, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
135. Id. at 591-92, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 114-15.
136. Baxter, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 590-91, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 113-14. The court noted the
trend towards broadening the term "joint tortfeasor" to include those defendants who acted
jointly, concurrently, or simultaneously. See, e.g., Turcon Constr., Inc. v. Norton-Villiers,
Ltd., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1983) (expanding the definition of the term
"joint tortfeasor" to include concurrent and successive tortfeasors); Kohn v. Superior Court
of San Mateo County, 142 Cal. App. 3d 323, 191 Cal. Rptr. 78 (1983) (fraud and failure to
repair or inspect occurring on different dates created indivisible injury and consequent "joint
tortfeasor" status for purposes of section 877.6). See generally, 5 WrixYN, SumMARY op
CmALIoRN A LAw, Torts, §§ 43-47, 106-110 (9th ed. 1988) (discussing expansion of term "joint
tortfeasor").
137. See Horton v. Superior Court, 194 Cal. App. 3d 727, 735, 238 Cal. Rptr. 467, 471
(1987) (non-settling tortfeasor not claiming total indemnity but that other party is 100% liable).
138. See Zarback v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 3d 120, 240 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1987)
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total indemnity was one end of the spectrum of comparative equitable
indemnification. 39 However, the primacy in these cases of the policy
of encouraging settlements over the policy of fairly allocating loss,
deviates from the principle of equitable allocation of fault enumerated
in Li.'40
b. Good Faith Settlement does not Foreclose a Claim by a
Derivative or Vicariously Liable Defendant for Total Equitable
Indemnity
Although the majority of courts ruled that total indemnity was
subsumed by the partial indemnity principles of American Motor-
cycle, some courts refused to abrogate total indemnity in situations
involving vicarious or derivative liability.14' These cases recognized
the doctrinal distinctions between contribution and indemnity by
holding that total indemnity survived American Motorcycle and sec-
tion 877.6. In a postjudgment action for indemnity, the Court of
Appeals for the Fourth District ruled in E.L. White, Inc. v. City of
Huntington Beach that the doctrine of total equitable indemnity
survives the decision in American Motorcycle.142 In White, represen-
tatives of a deceased employee of a subcontractor brought a wrongful
death action against the City of Huntington Beach and a contractor
reh'g granted 746 P.2d 451, 242 Cal. Rptr. 476 (1987) remanded by Supreme Court 763 P.2d
479, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988) (vicariously liable defendant barred from pursuing claim of
total indemnity against settling tortfeasor); accord In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litigation, 661
F. Supp. 1403 (S.D.Cal. 1987); IRM Corp. v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 224 Cal. Rptr.
438 (1986) (good faith settlement bars claim for total indemnity under active/passive and
implied contractual theories).
139. See, e.g., Baxter, 176 Cal. App. 3d at 588-89, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 112-13.
140. See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text for discussion of the Li case.
141. See Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 914, 236 Cal. Rptr. 224
(1987) reh'g granted 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1987) remanded by Supreme Court
763 P.2d 479, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988); Hale v. Laden, 178 Cal. App. 3d 668, 224 Cal.
Rptr. 182 (1986) (section 877.6 bars subsequent claim for equitable indemnity when measurable
allegation of negligence, but does not bar claims for total shifting of liability); Angelus Assocs.
Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985)
(doctrine of total indemnity continues to exist separate and distinct from comparative indem-
nity); Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984) (doctrine of
total indemnity exists separate and distinct from comparative indemnity); White v. City of
Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 187 Cal. Rptr. 879 (1982) (good faith settlement
not a bar to claim for total indemnity).
142. E.L. White, Inc. v. City of Huntington Beach, 138 Cal. App. 3d 366, 187 Cal. Rptr.
879 (1983). See Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co. 46 Cal. 3d 796, 808 n.8, 760 P.2d 399
n.8, 916-17, 251 Cal. Rptr. 202, 210 n.8 (1988) (White did not address the right to total
indemnity after a good faith settlement).
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hired by the city. 43 Two of the chief construction inspectors of the
city were present at the construction site where the employee was
killed, and although they noticed safety violations, they took no
action to remedy the violations.IM The contractor brought an action
for total indemnity against the city. 14 The city argued that the
decision in American Motorcycle precluded the award of total equi-
table indemnity to the contractor. 46
The court rejected the argument made by the city by explaining
that American Motorcycle sought simply to modify the all-or-nothing
rule against loss sharing absent a joint judgment to allow loss sharing
in appropriate cases. 147 The court explained that the loss sharing rules
apply only to those defendants who share responsibility for causing
injury and do not apply to those who are free from active fault. 4 '
The court explained that the loss sharing principles of American
Motorcycle are not applicable to defendants whose liability is based
on public policy and not a result of any shared active fault.' 49
Consequently, since the city had been found actively at fault and the
liability of the contractor was based on statutory vicarious liability, 5 0
the court held that vicarious or derivative liability did not fit within
the framework of comparative fault principles.' 5' The court explained
that American Motorcycle did not abandon the traditional concepts
of total equitable indemnity and allowed the claim by the contractor
for total equitable indemnity against the city.5 2
143. White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 375, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
144. Id. at 375-76, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
145. Id.
146. Id. at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885.
147. Id. at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885 (citing American Motorcycle Ass'n v. Superior
Court, 20 Cal. 3d. 578, 598, 578 P.2d 899, 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 195 (1980)).
148. Id.
149. Id. at 377, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 886. As the decision in American Motorcycle relied on
the equitable indemnity principles enumerated in a similarly situated New York court in Dole
v. Dow Chem. Co., 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d. 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 386 (1972), the court
in White relied on subsequent rulings of New York courts regarding the continued existence
of total indemnity after Dole. White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 376, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885. The
New York courts had consistently held that the common law principles of full indemnity had
not been abrogated and that a vicariously liable tortfeasor could still obtain full indemnity.
Id. at 375-77, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 885-86 (citing D'Ambrosio v. City of New York, 44 N.Y.2d
454, 435 N.E.2d. 366, 450 N.Y.S.2d 149, 152 (1982)).
150. White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 377, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 886. The contractor was held
vicariously liable under the "peculiar risk" doctrine. Id. at 377-78 n.4, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 886
n.4. See REsTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF ToRTs §§ 413, 416 (1979) (liability of an employer of an
independent contractor for physical harm caused when the employer should recognize the
employment is likely to create a peculiar risk of physical harm). See generally, Comment,
Clarifying the Peculiar Risk Doctrine: The Rule Restated, 20 PAC. L.J. 197 (1988) (discussion
of the peculiar risk doctrine).
151. White, 138 Cal. App. 3d at 377-78, 187 Cal. Rptr. at 886.
152. Id.
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Subsequent decisions cite the White interpretation of American
Motorcycle for the proposition that vicariously liable defendants may
still obtain full indemnity from a settling tortfeasor under section
877.6.1 In Huizar v. Abex Corporation, the Court of Appeals for
the Second District held that a good faith settlement under section
877.6 did not bar subsequent claims for equitable or total indem-
nity.Y14 In Huizar, the injured plaintiff sued a product manufacturer
and its distributor for injuries sustained to his hand as a result of a
defective punch press.155 The manufacturer then filed a cross-com-
plaint against the distributor seeking partial indemnity. 5 6 The dis-
tributor, in turn, filed a cross-complaint against the manufacturer
for total indemnity based on the distributor's status as a derivative
tortfeasor.' 7 Both the manufacturer and the distributor entered into
pretrial settlements with the plaintiff pursuant to section 877.6.158
Upon a determination of good faith, the trial court dismissed the
cross-complaints.159
After affirming the determination by the trial court of good faith
as to the respective settlements of the parties, the court held that a
good faith settlement under section 877.6 barred the manufacturers
claim for partial indemnity. 60 However, the court held that section
877.6 did not bar the claim which rested on traditional notions of
total indemnity by the distributor.' 6' The court explained that, con-
trary to the manufacturer's contentions, neither American Motorcycle
nor its codification in section 887.6 abolished total equitable indem-
nity. 162 The court stressed that the California Supreme Court in
American Motorcycle would have expressly stated an intent to abolish
the doctrine of total indemnity had they intended that result. 63
Further, had the legislature intended to bar claims for total indemnity
under section 877.6, the appropriate language would have been
153. See, e.g., Huizar v. Abex Corp. 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47, 51
(1984); Angelus Assocs. Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 542,
213 Cal. Rptr. 403, 409 (1985); Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 914,
917, 236 Cal. Rptr. 224, 226 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1987), reh'g granted 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal.
Rptr. 66 (1987) remanded by Supreme Court 763 P.2d 479, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988).
154. Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr. 47 (1984).





160. Id. at 539-40, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50.
161. Id. at 540, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 49-50 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 886B,
comment d).
162. Id. at 541-42, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 50-51.
163. Id.
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incorporated into the statute. 164 Finally, the court stated that cases
subsequent to American Motorcycle expressly left open the question
of whether a claim for total equitable indemnity based on derivative
or vicarious liability still existed. 65 Consequently, the court held that
when the liability of a completely blameless party is premised solely
upon the tortious act or omission of another, the doctrine of equitable
or total indemnity continues to exist separate and distinct from that
of contribution.Ie6
The Court of Appeals for the Fourth District used a different
rationale in allowing a claim for total indemnity after a good faith
settlement under section 877.6. In Angelus Associates Corporation
v. Neonex Leisure Products, Inc.,167 the court held that vicariously
or derivatively liable defendants are not tortfeasors within the mean-
ing of section 877.6 and therefore not subject to the good faith
bar. 16 In reversing the dismissal of a cross-complaint for total
indemnity, the court focused on two issues: whether total indemnity
existed after American Motorcycle and whether a claim for total
indemnity could be brought against a tortfeasor who settles in good
faith with the plaintiff under section 877.6.169 The court held that
section 877.6 barred only cross-complaints against a tortfeasor settling
164. Id.
165. Id. at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51 (citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d
322, 332 n.5, 579 P.2d 441, 446 n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 n.5 (1978)).
The court remanded the Huizar case for a trial on the merits of the distributor's claim for
total indemnity. The court held that should the trier of fact determine active negligence in any
degree in contributing to the plaintiff's injuries, then principles of comparative negligence
would apply and the distributor would be barred from obtaining any contribution from the
manufacturer. Id. at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51. If the trial court found fault on the part of
the distributor, the distributor's claim would be for a sharing of liability between joint
tortfeasors and would be barred by a good faith settlement under section 877.6. However, if
the trial court found no fault on the part of the distributor, then the distributor's claim would
be for a shifting of liability between one who was at fault and one whose liability was imposed
by public policy. See supra note 122 discussing the Kohn case (court denied indemnitee the
opportunity to litigate its claim).
166. Id. at 542, 203 Cal. Rptr. at 51.
167. Angelus Assocs. Corp. v. Neonex Leisure Prods., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213
Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985).
168. Id. The court defined "tortfeasor" as "[a] wrong-doer; one who commits or is guilty
of a tort." Id. at 541, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 408-9 (citing Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed. 1979)
at 1335).
In Angelus, plaintiffs were injured by an explosion within their motorhome. Id. at 534, 213
Cal. Rptr. at 403-4. They sued the manufacturers of several component parts, the manufacturer
of the motorhome itself, and the retailer who sold them the motorhome. Id. The manufacturer
of the motorhome settled with the plaintiff and, upon a finding of good faith, the trial court
dismissed all cross-complaints by co-defendants against the manufacturer. Id. The retailer
appealed the dismissal of its cross-complaint for total equitable indemnity. Id.
169. Id. at 536-37, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 405-6.
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in good faith for partial or comparative indemnity based on com-
parative fault. 170 Thus, the court held that total indemnity still exists
in situations where the nonsettling defendant is vicariously or deriv-
atively liable.17 ' The court further held that the settlement procedure
under section 877.6 had no application to complaints for total
indemnity. 72 The court explained that the liability of the retailer
stemmed solely from the retailer's relationship with the manufacturer
in the context of the marketing chain. 7 3 The court stated that the
retailer was neither a wrongdoer nor a tortfeasor. 7 4 Consequently,
the principles of comparative fault were inapplicable since they
provide a means of apportioning fault only among wrongdoers.1
75
Finally, the court addressed the effects of its conclusion on pretrial
settlements. 176 The court explained that the decision to allow claims
for total indemnity after a good faith settlement would adversely
affect pretrial settlements only when defendants who are clearly at
fault attempt to buy peace too cheaply at the expense of vicariously
liable defendants. 177 Further, proper pretrial analysis of the allegations
contained in the complaints in order to determine the availability of
common law indemnity protects against uncertainty in settlements.
78
A question arose as to whether the broad settlement provisions of
Tech-Bilt eliminated the need to preserve claims for total equitable
indemnity after a good faith settlement. 79 The Court of Appeals for
170. Id. at 536, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 405.
171. Id. at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10. See Hale v. Laden, 178 Cal. App. 3d 668, 224
Cal. Rptr. 182 (1986) (the right to total indemnity survives a good faith settlement, but is
barred by section 877.6(c) as long as a measurable allegation of negligence by a co-defendant
exists). See also Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 914, 918, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 225, 227 (Cal. App. 4 Dist. 1987) reh'g granted 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1987)
remanded by Supreme Court 763 P.2d 479, 252 Cal. Rptr. 816 (1988) (Hale not inconsistent
with holding in Angelus that total indemnity exists after American Motorcycle).
172. Angelus, 167 Cal. App. 3d at 541, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 408-9.
173. Id.
174. Id. The court explained that the retailer was entitled to total indemnity because under
the doctrine of strict products liability, all persons and entities in the manufacturing and
marketing chain are liable to the plaintiff even if they are not responsible for the defect
proximately causing the loss. Id. at 535, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 404-5. However, as between
themselves, persons not at fault for the defect are entitled to indemnity from those who are
at fault, based on equitable principles. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 541-42, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 408-10.
176. Id. at 542-43, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409-10.
177. Id. at 542, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 409.
178. Id.
179. See Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 511 n.5, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825,
833 n.5 (1984) (with a broad definition of good faith, the preservation of actions for total
equitable indemnity as in Huizar is not necessary). See supra note 97-101 and accompanying
text (discussing the decision in Tech-Bilt).
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the Fourth District ruled that the broad settlement provisions of
Tech-Bilt had no effect on the right to total equitable indemnity. 10
In Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., the court held that plain-
tiff's pleadings alleged facts sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to
proceed with an action for total equitable indemnity against a joint
tortfeasor notwithstanding a good faith settlement with the plain-
tiffs.' 81 The court explained that claims for total indemnity were not
intended to be barred by section 877.6 absent contrary legislative
enactment. 
1 2
The decisions holding that claims for total indemnity survived a
good faith settlement focused on a number of different principles.
White relied primarily on the doctrinal distinctions between partial
indemnity and total equitable indemnity.'83 Huizar focused on judicial
language and legislative intent. 184 Angelus focused on deterrence of
settlements and the definition of joint tortfeasor under section 877.6.1'1
Finally, Tulco noted that broad settlement provisions had no effect
on the continued right to claim total equitable indemnity. 86
The California Courts of Appeal were clearly divided on the
doctrinal distinctions underlying the settlement practices of section
877.6. While some courts found that a good faith settlement barred
subsequent claims for total indemnity, 18 7 other courts concluded that
180. Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 914, 918, 236 Cal. Rptr.
224, 227 (1987) rev. granted 737 P.2d 1350, 238 Cal. Rptr. 66 (1988) remanded by Supreme
Court 252 Cal. Rptr. 816, 763 P.2d 479 (1988). In Tulco, heirs of employees severely burned
or killed as a result of an explosion from the manufacture of a batch of epoxy brought actions
for negligence and strict products liability against the employer and the manufacturers (Tulco
and Ciba-Geigy) of defective ingredients, the distributor of the ingredients, and licensor of the
ingredients. Id. at 916, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 225. Tulco and Ciba-Geigy each settled with the
plaintiffs and the trial court dismissed the subsequent cross-complaints. Id. Tulco, which
claimed total equitable indemnity based on derivative liability, appealed the dismissal of its
cross-complaint. Id.
Compare Torres v. Union Pac. R.R., 157 Cal. App. 3d 499, 511 n.5, 203 Cal. Rptr. 825,
833 n.5, (1984) (broad definition of "good faith" may make the exception for total indemnity
unnecessary) with Tulco, Inc. v. Narmco Materials, Inc., 203 Cal. App. 3d 919, 918, 236 Cal.
Rptr. 224, 227 (1987) (broad "good faith" standard enumerated in Tech-Bilt does not affect
right to total indemnity).
181. Tulco, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 923, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 230. The court remanded the case
for a determination of fault of any degree on the part of the petitioner, a finding of which
would bring petitioner's claim for indemnity within the ambit of section 877.6. Id. at 923, 236
Cal. Rptr. at 230-31. See also Huizar v. Abex Corp., 156 Cal. App. 3d 534, 203 Cal. Rptr.
47 (1984) (case remanded for finding of measurable allocation of fault).
182. Tulco, 203 Cal. App. 3d at 922-23, 236 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
183. See supra notes 142-152 and accompanying text.
184. See supra notes 154-166 and accompanying text.
185. See supra notes 167-178 and accompanying text.
186. See supra notes 180-182 and accompanying text.
187. See supra notes 105-140 and accompanying text for cases which bar claims for total
indemnity after a good faith settlement.
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a codefendant's right to total equitable indemnity survived a joint
tortfeasor's good faith settlement. 188 Recent courts have acknowledged
the conflicting interpretations among the courts of appeal and awaited
guidance from the California Supreme Court. 189 In September 1988,
the California Supreme Court settled the issue in Far West Financial
Corp. v. D & S Co., Inc.190
II. THE CASE
In Far West Financial Corporation v. D & S Company, Inc., the
California Supreme Court absolved a tortfeasor who had entered
into a good faith settlement from further claims for total equitable
indemnity by a vicariously liable defendant. 9 The court held that
only a single doctrine of loss apportionment exists in California in
light of the judicial background, the legislative history, and the
legislative intent of section 877.6.192 Total indemnity is simply one
end of the spectrum of loss apportionment even when based on
vicarious or derivative liability. 193 The court explained that a vicari-
ously liable defendant will be afforded protection against harm from
an unfair settlement by a pretrial determination of "good faith"
under section 877.6(c). 194 The court further explained that the inclu-
sion of total indemnity claims in comparative indemnity is consistent
with the statutory objectives of section 877.6(c): the encouragement
188. See supra notes 141-182 and accompanying text for discussion of cases which do not
bar claims for total indemnity after a good faith settlement.
189. See Zarback v. Superior Court, 195 Cal. App. 3d 120, 240 Cal. Rptr. 479 (1987)
(seeing no purpose in reiterating the rationales, policies, and legal analyses of minority and
majority courts, court adopted majority view as enumerated in Baxter); Horton v. Superior
Court of Kern County, 194 Cal. App. 3d 727, 740, 238 Cal. Rptr. 467 (1987) (until the
Supreme Court resolves the issue, adopting the majority view that total equitable indemnity
exists only as one end of the spectrum of comparative equitable indemnification); IRM Corp.
v. Carlson, 179 Cal. App. 3d 94, 109-10, 224 Cal. Rptr. 438, 446 (1986) (after an exhaustive
analysis of both the majority and minority views, the court was simply persuaded that the
abandonment of the concept of total implied indemnity and its accompanying passive/active
analysis was more consistent with concept of comparative indemnity espoused in American
Motorcycle and section 877.6). See also In re Nucorp Energy Sec. Litigation, 661 F. Supp.
1403, 1413-1414 (S.D. Cal. 1987) (absent guidance from state supreme court, federal court
sitting in diversity jurisdiction adopts state majority view that section 877.6 bars claims for
total indemnity by vicariously or derivatively liable defendants).
190. Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 760 P.2d 399, 251 Cal. Rptr.
202 (1988).
191. Id. at 800, 760 P.2d at 401, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 204.
192. Id. at 808, 760 P.2d at 407, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
193. Id. at 808-9, 760 P.2d at 407, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
194. Id. at 815, 760 P.2d at 412, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 215.
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of settlements, and the equitable allocation of costs among multiple
tortfeasors.195
A. The Facts
Far West Financial Corporation (Far West), a real estate developer
involved in the financing and developing of condominiums, entered
into a contract with D&S Company (D&S), a general contractor, for
the building of a condominium project, called the Studio Village
Townhouse Development. 96 Shortly after the completion of the pro-
ject and the sale of the units, a number of defects in the common
areas of the project appeared.' 97 In October 1976, the Studio Village
Homeowners Association (Association) and Far West entered into a
settlement and release agreement in which Far West agreed to make
a number of repairs in return for an agreement by the Association
to release Far West from any further liability for the defects of the
project. 198 Several years later, serious latent defects appeared after a
heavy rainstorm season. 199 The Association attempted to set aside the
prior settlement and filed suit against Far West, D&S, and numerous
subcontractors, engineering firms, and architects who had worked
on the project."O In July 1981, Far West filed a cross-complaint
against D&S seeking either indemnity or contribution from D&S. 20
In early 1984, Far West entered into a settlement agreement with the
Association." The trial court found the settlement with the Associ-
ation to be in good faith pursuant to section 887.6 and dismissed
the numerous indemnity cross-complaints that existed against Far
West. Although the actions against Far West had been dismissed,
Far West continued to pursue a cross-complaint against the remaining
195. Id. at 810-14, 760 P.2d at 408-411, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 211-214.




200. Id. The Association attempted to set aside the prior agreement on the grounds of
fraudulent concealment of the defects at the time of the initial settlement, negligent and
intentional misrepresentation, strict liability, breach of express and implied warranties, negli-
gence, and fraud and deceit. Id.
201. Id. Far West claimed that D&S had exercised complete control over the construction
of the project and that any deficiencies in the construction were attributable to D&S or to the
subcontractors hired by D&S. Id.
202. Id. Far West agreed to pay $315,000 outright and a sliding scale guaranty of an
additional $35,000 recovery in return for the Association's agreement to release Far West from
any further liability. Id.
203. Id.
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defendants. 2°4 In August 1984, D&S entered into a settlement agree-
ment with the Association0 s conditioned on both a good faith de-
termination and dismissal of all outstanding cross-complaints pending
against D&S.206 D&S then moved for an order declaring the settlement
agreement in good faith and dismissing all of the pending cross-
complaints against it.27 Far West filed a motion in opposition con-
tending that a good faith settlement under section 877.6 did not
operate to bar a claim for complete or total indemnity.
20 8
The trial court found the D&S settlement to be in good faith and
dismissed all of the cross-complaints against D&S. 209 Far West ap-
pealed, contending that a claim for total equitable indemnity could
not be extinguished by a good faith settlement. 210 The Court of
Appeals for the Second District affirmed.21' The California Supreme
Court granted review in order to resolve conflicting decisions among
the courts of appeals.
212
B. The Majority Opinion
In an opinion written by Justice Arguelles, the California Supreme
Court affirmed the decisions of the appellate and trial courts. 213 The
court held that sectiorl 877.6 barred the complaint by Far West for
total indemnity.21 4 First, the court examined the judicial development
204. Id. Far West sought indemnification for the $315,000 it had paid to the Association.
Id. The court noted that Far West was within its rights to continue to seek indemnification
in this manner. Id. at 801-802, 760 P.2d at 402, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 205 (citing Sears, Roebuck
and Co. v. International Harvester Co., 82 Cal. App. 3d 492, 147 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1978) and
Bolamperti v. Larco Mfg., 164 Cal. App. 3d 249, 210 Cal. Rptr. 155 (1985)).
205. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 801-2, 760 P.2d at 402, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 205. D&S agreed






210. Id. at 803, 760 P.2d at 403, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
211. Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 189 Cal. App. 3d 1322, 234 Cal. Rptr. 771
(1987). The Court of Appeals for the Second District rejected the distinction between total
and partial indemnity, stating that "Itlotal indemnity is just one end of the spectrum of
comparative equitable indemnification." Id. at 775 (citing Standard Pac. of San Diego v. A.A.
Baxter Corp., 176 Cal. App. 3d 577, 587-88, 222 Cal. Rptr. 106, 112 (1986)).
212. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 799, 760 P.2d at 401, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 202.
213. Id. at 880, 760 P.2d at 403, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 206.
214. Id. However, the California Supreme Court declined to rule on whether an indemnity
claim resting on an implied contract theory or arising from an express indemnification agreement
is barred by a good faith settlement under section 877.6(c). Id. at 803 n.5, 760 P.2d at 403
n.5, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 206 n.5.
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of total equitable indemnity following the decision in American
Motorcycle."5 Second, the court examined whether section 877.6
included claims for total indemnity in addition to claims for contri-
bution.2 6 Finally, the Court examined the effects of its holding in
light of the legislative policies underlying section 877.6.217
1. Total Equitable Indemnity
The court recognized the mandate of American Motorcycle that a
tortfeasor who enters into a good faith settlement with a plaintiff is
free from any subsequent claim for contribution. 218 The court, how-
ever, rejected the argument that Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart219
provided support for the claim by Far West that total equitable
indemnity and comparative indemnity are separate legal concepts.22
The court explained that the subsequent decision of People ex rel.
Dept. of Transportation v. Superior Court22' clarified the confusion
surrounding American Motorcycle and Safeway Stores.222 Conse-
quently, the holding in People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation clearly
indicated that American Motorcycle did not create two separate
equitable indemnity doctrines, but a single comparative indemnity
doctrine that permits partial indemnification on a comparative fault
basis.223
215. Id. at 805-808, 760 P.2d at 404-8, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 207-11.
216. Id. at 808-9, 760 P.2d at 407-8, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 210-11.
217. Id. at 810-14, 760 P.2d at 408-11, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 211-14.
218. Id. at 806, 760 P.2d at 405, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 208 (citing American Motorcycle, 20
Cal. 3d at 604, 578 P.2d at 915, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 198)).
219. Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550
(1978).
220. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 806-807, 760 P.2d at 406, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 209, (citing
Safeway Stores v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d 441 (1978)). See
Comment, Indemnity in California: Is it Really Equitable After American Motorcycle and
Section 877.6? 18 PAc. L.J. 201 (1986) (language in Safeway Stores provides support for the
claim that a right to total indemnity continues to exist despite good faith settlement).
221. People ex rel. Department of Transportation v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 744, 608
P.2d 673, 163 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1980).
222. People ex rel. Department of Transp. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 744, 608 P.2d
673, 163 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1980). Justice Arguelles explained that American Motorcycle did not
create a new type of indemnity based on a new theoretical basis, but simply modified the
existing pre-American Motorcycle equitable indemnity doctrine. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 807,
760 P.2d at 406-7, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (citing People ex rel. Department of Transp. v.
Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 744, 608 P.2d 673, 163 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1980)).
223. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 807, 760 P.2d at 406-7, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 209 (citing People
ex rel. Dept. of Transp. v. Superior Court, 26 Cal. 3d 744, 608 P.2d 673, 163 Cal. Rptr. 585
(1980)).
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2. Legislative Intent Behind Section 877.6
The court next considered the effect of the enactment of section
877.6 on the doctrine of total indemnity. The court found that the
legal background and legislative history of section 877.6 support the
interpretation adopted by the majority of the courts of appeals.2
The court explained that the legislature indicated no intention to
distinguish some indemnity claims from others by enacting section
877.6.2 The court concluded that the legislative history of section
877.6 indicated that the legislature had simply intended not to alter
existing law, which was a single comparative indemnity doctrine .
226
Consequently, the court held that the legislature intended section
877.6 to bar the entire spectrum of potential indemnity claims because
existing law included only a single comparative indemnity doctrine. 227
3. Policies Underlying Section 877.6
The court stated that including total indemnity claims within types
of claims barred by good faith settlements under section 877.6
supports the legislative policies underlying the settlement rules in
California. First, the court examined the effect on the settlement
provisions of section 877.6.28 Second, the court examined the effect
on the equitable allocation of costs among multiple tortfeasors. 229
Finally, the court discussed the effect of settlement provisions on
defendants whose liability is imposed based on public policy.230
The court reiterated that a lack of finality would discourage
settlements whether the claim was for total indemnity or partial/
comparative indemnity. 231 The Court rejected the argument made by
224. Id. at 808-9, 760 P.2d at 407-8, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 210. See supra notes 105-140 and
accompanying text discussing those cases holding that good faith settlements bar subsequent
claims for total indemnity.
225. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 808-9, 760 P.2d at 407-8, 291 Cal. Rptr. at 210.
226. Id. at 809 n.9, 760 P.2d at 407 n.9, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 210 n.9. The court explained
that according to the Legislative Digest of the bill, the drafters intended simply to codify the
effect of a good faith settlement under "existing law." Id.
227. Id.
228. Id. at 811, 760 P.2d at 408-9, 251 Cal. Rptr. 211-12.
229. Id. at 814-15, 760 P.2d at 411, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
230. Id. at 813 n.13, 760 P.2d at 410-11 n.13, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14 n.13.
231. Id. at 810, 760 P.2d at 408-9, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 211-12 (citing American Motorcycle
20 Cal. 3d 578, 604, 578 P.2d 899, 915-16, 146 Cal. Rptr. 182, 198-99 (1978)).
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Far West that claims for total equitable indemnity would have
minimal effect on settlement practices in light of the overriding
objective of equitable allocation of loss among multiple tortfeasors. 32
The court found that allowing an exception under section 877.6
would encourage litigants to characterize claims as derivative or
vicarious in order to avoid finality of the settlement. 233 Further, a
determination that a defendant's liability is vicarious or derivative
provides no assurance that the defendant would be entitled to a total
shifting of liability or succeed in a claim for total indemnity. 234 Thus,
the court concluded that in most cases, a settling defendant would
face continued litigation on a total indemnity claim by a nonsettling
defendant.235
The court stated that a good faith determination under the Tech-
Bilt standards equitably allocates loss under section 877.6.26 The
court explained that the reasonable range criteria under the Tech-Bilt
approach protects a vicariously or derivatively liable tortfeasor, like
any other minimally culpable tortfeasor, against harm from an unfair
settlement.2 7 The court conceded that a non-settling tortfeasor might
be left to bear some portion of the plaintiff's loss.238 However, the
court noted that good faith under Tech-Bilt is met even if the settling
defendant pays less than their proportionate share, as long as that
defendant pays less in settlement than they would at trial.239
232. Id. at 811, 760 P.2d at 408-9, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 211-12.
233. Id. at 811-12, 760 P.2d at 409-10, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 212-13 (citing e.g. City of
Sacramento v. Gemsch Inv. Co., 115 Cal. App. 3d 869, 171 Cal. Rptr. 764 (1981)).
234. Id. at 812, 760 P.2d at 410, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 213. The court explained that the
characterization of a defendant's liability as vicarious or derivative provides no assurance that
the defendant bears no responsibility for the plaintiff's harm. Id. A defendant who is vicariously
liable for the acts of another might also bear some direct responsibility for an accident; e.g.
negligent hiring or supervision of an agent. Id.
235. Id. at 814, 760 P.2d at 411, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
236. Id. at 814-15, 760 P.2d at 411, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 214.
237. Id. The court stated:
If a more culpable tortfeasor settles with the plaintiff before the vicariously liable
tortfeasor, and if the settlement does not require the more culpable tortfeasor to
bear its fair share of the loss, the trial court can find that the settlement is not in
good faith and, as a consequence, the settlement will not bar the less culpable
tortfeasor from pursuing its equitable indemnity claim ... [Similarly], if, as in this
case, an allegedly vicariously liable tortfeasor has already settled with the plaintiff
in order to limit its potential liability and has continued to pursue its indemnity
claim, the allegedly less culpable tortfeasor retains the right to challenge the good
faith of any subsequent settlement by the allegedly more culpable tortfeasor.
Id.
238. Id. at 816, 760 P.2d at 413, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 216 (citing Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at
499, 698 P.2d at 166-67, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263).
239. Id.
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Finally, the court held that the vicarious or derivative nature of a
tortfeasor's liability does not justify special treatment from the
settlement rules applicable to other joint tortfeasors whose liability
is based on public policy.2 ° The court explained by example that
both vicarious liability and strict product liability rest on policies of
deliberate allocation of risk.24' According to the court, a vicariously
or derivatively liable defendant should not be afforded special treat-
ment to pursue an indemnity action while a strictly liable defendant
is barred from pursuing the same claim.242
C. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Kaufman agreed with the majority that claims for total
loss sharing or contribution are barred by a good faith settlement
but argued that section 877.6 does not bar a claim for total loss
shifting based on indemnity by a vicariously liable defendant. 243
Justice Kaufman posed three arguments against the majority's holding
that a good faith settlement bars subsequent claims by vicariously
liable defendants for total indemnity. 4  First, a claim for total
indemnity based on vicarious liability differs in kind from other
indemnity claims. 245 According to Justice Kaufman, a vicariously
liable defendant is not a tortfeasor but simply an involuntary surety
or guarantor.? Justice Kaufman opined that the majority incorrectly
240. Id. at 813 n.13, 760 P.2d at 410-11 n.13, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14 n.13.
241. Id.
242. Id. The court explained that in strict products liability, for example:
**. tort law places the "direct" liability on an individual or entity which may have
exercised due care in order to serve the public policies of a fair allocation of the
costs of accidents or to encourage even greater safety efforts than are imposed by
the due care standard. . . [T]he modem justification for vicarious liability closely
parallels the justification for imposing liability on the nonnegligent manufacturer of
a product ... Thus, the fact that a tortfeasor's liability is vicarious does not
necessarily distinguish him from other tortfeasors nor does it indicate the public
policies on which tort liability rests justify special dispensation from the good faith
settlement rules applicable to other tortfeasors.
Id.
243. Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 817, 760 P.2d 399, 251 Cal.
Rptr. 202 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
244. Id. at 817-828, 760 P.2d at 413-421, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217-224 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).
245. Id. at 818, 760 P.2d at 413, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
246. Id. at 819-20, 760 P.2d at 414-15, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18. California Code of Civil
Procedure section 876(b) provides in relevant part: "Where one or more persons are held
liable solely for the tort of one of them or of another, as in the case of the liability of a
master for the tort of his servant, they shall contribute a single pro rata share, as to which
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attempted to equate the imposition of strict products liability on
manufacturers with the justification for imposing vicarious or deriv-
ative liability. 247 Further, the majority ignored historical logic, prec-
edent, and fairness by equating vicariously liable parties with joint
and concurrent tortfeasors who defectively manufacture products. 28
Second, Justice Kaufman explained that section 877.6 does not
authorize or support the rule that total indemnity claims based on
vicarious liability are barred by good faith settlements. 249 By enacting
section 877.6, the legislature intended to preserve rights of indemnity
under the existing law.50 Since vicarious liability had never been
subject to a good faith settlement bar, Justice Kaufman stated that
the enactment of section 877.6 had no effect on rights to total
indemnity. 2 ' Justice Kaufman believed that the decision in American
Motorcycle did not replace or supersede earlier actions for total
indemnity, but simply recognized and created a rule allowing loss
sharing without a joint judgment .2 2 Thus, Justice Kaufman concluded
that section 877.6 could not be interpreted to bar claims for total
indemnity based on vicarious liability after a good faith settlement.21
there may be indemnity between them." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 876(b). Justice Kaufman
explained:
As the Legislature has recognized in section 876(b), one who is vicariously liable is
not a tortfeasor. When the issue is equitable apportionment of responsibility for the
plaintiff's loss, the vicariously liable party and the fault-source defendant are to be
jointly assessed a single share based on the fault of the latter but as between
themselves apportionment of loss is governed by the traditional rule of full equitable
indemnity, a rule of loss shifting rather than loss sharing, as the law has recognized
from very early days. (emphasis in original)
Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 819-20, 760 P.2d at 414-15, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217-18 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).
247. Far West at 819, 760 P.2d at 414, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
See id., 46 Cal. 3d at 813 n.13, 760 P.2d at 410-11 n.13, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 213-14 n.13
(equating strict products liability with vicarious liability).
248. Id. at 819, 399 P.2d at 414, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
249. Id. at 821, 760 P.2d at 416-17, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
250. Id. California Code of Civil Procedure section 875 (f) provides in relevant part: "This
title shall not impair any right of indemnity under existing law.. ." CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §
875(0 (West 1980).
251. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 821, 760 P.2d at 416-17, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 219 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting).
252. Id. at 822, 760 P.2d at 417, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 220 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). This
interpretation is supported by statements in Safeway Stores that the court had "no occasion
to determine whether the comparative indemnity doctrine should be applied in a situation in
which a party's liability is entirely derivative or vicarious in nature." Safeway Stores, 21 Cal.
3d at 332 n.5, 579 P.2d at 446 n.5, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 555 n.5. See also Comment, Indemnity
in California: Is it Really Equitable After American Motorcycle and Section 877.6? 18 PAC.
L.J. 201 (1986) (language in Safeway Stores supports the theory that a claim for total indemnity
continues to exist despite good faith settlement). See supra notes 65-79 and accompanying text
(discussing the decision in American Motorcycle).
253. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 823, 760 P.2d at 417-18, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (Kaufman,
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Third, Justice Kaufman argued that the rule adopted by the
majority will not promote settlement. 25 4 Vicariously or derivatively
liable defendants will have a great disincentive to settle absent pro-
visions either reserving full veto power over subsequent settlements
or requiring the plaintiff to dismiss the causes of action against the
fault-source tortfeasor.2 5 Under the rule adopted by the majority,
only primarily liable tortfeasors seeking immunity from subsequent
indemnity claims by vicariously liable defendants will be encouraged
to settle, but at the expense of equitable allocation of fault .2 6 A
vicariously liable defendant in this situation may prefer to gamble at
trial rather than settle a claim he or she believes should be paid by
another .
257
In a separate dissenting opinion, Justice Eagleson agreed with
Justice Kaufman that section 877.6 should not bar a claim for total
indemnity based on vicarious liability after a good faith settlement .2
He added, however, that the majority's analysis resulted in funda-
J., dissenting). Justice Kaufman explained:
The majority's decision at this late date to extend the reach of section 877.6(c) to
include vicarious liability indemnity claims conflicts not only with the plain meaning
of that section's words, but also with subdivision (f) of section 875, which prohibits
any construction of section 877.6(c) impairing indemnity rights existing at the time
of its enactment.
Id.
254. Id. at 823-26, 760 P.2d at 418-20, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221-24 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
255. Id. at 824, 760 P.2d at 418, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). Justice
Kaufman explained that
[uinlike the majority, I think it improbable the vicariously liable tortfeasor will settle
in reliance on the trial court's power to withhold its "good faith" approval of a
later settlement by the fault-source tortfeasor which fails to provide reimbursement
for the vicariously liable defendant. Realizing the great pressure on trial courts to
approve settlements, and the unlikelihood of appellate reversal of a good faith
determination, vicariously liable defendants will prefer and probably insist on the
certainty of a veto or dismissal provision before making a substantial settlement
with the plaintiff.
Id. at 824 n.6, 760 P.2d at 418 n.6, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221 n.6 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
256. Id. at 824, 760 P.2d at 418, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 825, 760 P.2d at 419, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 222 (Kaufman, J., dissenting). Justice
Kaufman explained:
The issue is not whether any defendant has been given a fair opportunity to participate
in a settlement agreement but whether a solvent tortfeasor may shift any part of his
own liability onto a vicariously liable defendant. In the context of the good faith
determination this problem could be directly addressed by holding, as a matter of
law, that a settlement which fails to provide for dismissal of vicarious liability causes
of action based on the settlor's conduct is not in good faith, but the majority
expressly rejects this solution.
Id. (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
258. Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 828-832, 760 P.2d 399, 421-23,
251 Cal. Rptr. 202, 224-26 (1988) (Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting).
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mental unfairness.2 9 First, Justice Eagleson noted that the approach
of the majority unfairly treats a vicariously liable defendant required
to pay part of the plaintiff's damages by denying that party the
opportunity to seek indemnity from the tortfeasor who caused the
harm. 260 In an action for indemnity, there is no need to protect
plaintiffs as to fairness because they have already settled. 26' Thus,
the only question is whether fairness has been achieved among
defendants. 262 Justice Eagleson explained that, contrary to the holding
of the majority, a nonsettling vicariously or derivatively liable tort-
feasor is not in exactly the same position as any other minimally
culpable tortfeasor. 26 According to Justice Eagleson, the liability of
a vicariously liable tortfeasor is based upon responsibility for anoth-
er's wrongdoing whereas the liability for one who is minimally
culpable is based on that party's own wrongdoing. 264
Second, Justice Eagleson explained that the practicalities of settle-
ment practices under the majority rule would result in further un-
fairness.265 When a claim involves vicarious liability, a settlement
should be deemed in good faith only if the settlement leaves nothing
to be paid by the vicariously liable defendant. The refusal of the
majority to state as a matter of law that a settlement is not in good
faith unless the settlement also relieves the vicariously liable defendant
from further liability to the plaintiff results in fundamental unfair-
ness.266 However, even assuming that unfairness does not result when
the vicariously liable defendant is responsible for part of the plain-
tiff's damages, Justice Eagleson argued that fault on the part of the
259. Id. at 829, 760 P.2d at 421, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 224 (Eagleson, J., concurring dissenting).
260. Id. at 830, 760 P.2d at 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 226 (Eagleson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
261. Id. at 829, 760 P.2d at 421, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 224 (Eagleson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
262. Id. (Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting) (emphasis in original). Justice Eagleson
rejected any reliance on Safeway Stores for the proposition that imputed liability in a strict
liability sense is similar to imputed liability in a vicarious or derivative liability sense. First, a
strictly liable defendant is directly liable to the plaintiff, whereas a vicariously liable defendant
is only derivatively liable. Id. Second, a strictly liable defendant is an active tortfeasor; ic.
responsible for his own conduct. Id. Third, a strictly liable defendant may be at "fault" to
some degree. Id.
263. Id. at 830, 760 P.2d at 422, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 225-26 (Eagleson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
264. Id. (Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting).
265. Id. at 830-32, 760 P.2d at 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 226 (Eagleson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
266. Id. at 831, 760 P.2d at 423, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 226 (Eagleson, J., concurring and
dissenting).
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nonsettling vicariously liable defendant must be a prerequisite to a
settling defendant's good faith determination by the court.
267
III. LEGAL RAMCATIONS
A. Expansion of section 877.6
In Far West, the court overruled the decisions finding that claims
for total indemnity by vicariously or derivatively liable defendants
survived a good faith settlement. 26 18 Specifically, the court rejected
the contention that an indemnity action between a vicariously or
derivatively liable tortfeasor and a fault source tortfeasor is different
from the loss sharing enumerated in American Motorcycle and section
877.6.269 Thus, the court expanded American Motorcycle and section
877.6270 by completely subsuming total indemnity under the loss
sharing provisions of American Motorcycle.2 71
B. California Settlement Policies
1. Encouragement of settlements
The decision in Far West purports to fulfill the statutory objective
of promoting settlement. 272 After Far West, a vicariously liable de-
267. Id. (Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting).
268. See supra notes 141-182 and accompanying text (discussing the cases which hold that
total indemnity survives a good faith settlement).
269. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 804 n.7, 760 P.2d. at 404 n.7, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 207 n.7.
270. American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 599, 578 P.2d. at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195.
See also CAL. CIrv. PROC. CODE § 875(f) (West 1980) ("[tlhis title shall not impair any right
of indemnity under existing law ... ").
271. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF TORTS, § 886B, comment m, at 349 (1979)
(development of partial indemnity by courts constrained by contribution statute inevitably
results in merger of concepts of contribution and indemnity).
272. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 810, 760 P.2d at 408, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 211. The court stated
that "[flew things would be better calculated ... to discourage settlement of disputed tort
claims, than knowledge that such a settlement lacked finality and would lead to further
litigation with one's joint tortfeasors, and perhaps further liability." Id. (quoting Stambaugh
v. Superior Court, 62 Cal. App. 3d 232, 237, 132 Cal. Rptr. 843, 486 (1976)). Accord Lopez
v. Blecher 143 Cal. App. 3d 736, 741, 192 Cal. Rptr. 190 (1983).
But see Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 824, 760 P.2d at 418-19, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting) (defendants whose liability is based on vicarious or derivative liability will have
a great disincentive to settle absent a provision reserving to itself full veto power over subsequent
settlements or a provision requiring the plaintiff to dismiss the causes of action against the
fault-source tortfeasor). Justice Kaufman also recognized that veto powers have a chilling
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fendant who wishes to enter into a full value settlement with the
plaintiff must insist on a provision dismissing an action against fault
source defendants or giving the right to veto subsequent settlements.2 73
Otherwise, vicariously liable defendants who enter into full value
settlements might have their indemnity claims against the fault source
defendant barred by a trial judge who fails to consider the vicarious
nature of their liability.274 The unattractiveness of vicariously liable
defendants' insistence on veto provisions or dismissal of claims
against fault source defendants will increase the amount of plaintiffs'
settlement demand. 275 Moreover, veto provisions, by nature, lead to
inefficient and complex settlement practices.2 76 Although total pro-
tection from any subsequent claim encourages fault source tortfeasors
to settle, Far West discourages vicariously liable defendants, like Far
West, from entering into full value settlements because their subse-
quent claims will not be protected. 277 Consequently, Far West en-
effect on settlement and often result in unnecessary trials. Id. (citing Abbot T. Ford, Inc., v.
Superior Court 43 Cal. 3d 858, 883, 741 P.2d 124, 239 Cal. Rptr. 626 (1987)). See also id. at
831, 760 P.2d at 423, 291 Cal. Rptr. at 226 (Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting) (majority
refused to hold as a matter of law that a settlement by the directly liable tortfeasor with the
plaintiff which does not include a dismissal of the claim against the vicariously liable defendant
is not a "good faith" settlement).
273. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 824 n.6, 760 P.2d at 418 n.6, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221 n.6
(Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting). But see id. at 811 n.l1, 760 P.2d at 409 n.ll, 251,
Cal. Rptr. at 212 n.11 (a vicariously or derivatively liable defendant who wished to settle with
the plaintiff could settle for the full amount and obtain an agreement to dismiss the plaintiff's
action against the directly liable defendant). The facts of Far West provide an excellent example
of the land mines facing counsel for vicariously liable defendants in multiparty litigation:
[The] allegedly vicariously liable defendant (Far West) settled with the plaintiff first
and paid the settlement amount. Without doubt that was done with the full
expectation it could pursue its right to indemnification from the alleged wrongdoers
(D&S defendants), a right which ripened upon payment of the settlement amount.
The alleged wrongdoers thereafter unilaterally entered into a separate settlement with
the plaintiff and this courts now holds the vicariously liable defendant's clear right
to pursue the wrongdoer for indemnification is barred. It theorizes that in determining
a wrongdoer's settlement is in good faith the trial court can take into consideration
the fact that another defendant's liability is vicarious only. But there is no indication
that the trial court actually did so in this case.
Id. at 818, 760 P.2d at 414, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217.
274. Id.
275. Id. at 824, 760 P.2d at 418-19, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
276. See Abbott Ford, Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 858, 883, 741 P.2d 124, 239
Cal. Rptr. 626 (1987) (veto provisions in sliding scale agreements conflict with the public policy
favoring full settlement of litigation and may frequently lead to unnecessary trials).
277. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 824, 760 P.2d at 418-19, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221-22 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting). See Comment, Indemnity in California: Is it Really Equitable After American
Motorcycle and Section 877.6? 18 PAC. L.J. 201 (1986) (encouragement of settlements should
not take place at the expense of a blameless party). Vicariously liable defendants, like all other
parties to the action, weight the costs and benefits of settling the action. See infra notes 308-
322 (discussing settlement under Uniform Comparative Fault Act). As Justice Kaufman
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courages piecemeal settlement by various fault source tortfeasors at
the expense of full-value settlement by one vicariously liable defen-
dant. 278
2. Equitable allocation of costs among multiple tortfeasors
By denying a vicariously liable defendant the right to seek total
indemnity, the court tolerated unfairness in order to pursue the policy
of encouraging settlement.2 79 The majority asserts that the Tech-Bilt
good faith inquiry adequately protects vicariously liable defendants.
However, the facts of Far West demonstrate that Far West was not
afforded adequate protection under the Tech-Bilt approach and that
the majority's conclusion does not support its premise. 28°
3. Minitrials
The California Supreme Court has expressed disfavor with minitrial
procedures in a number of situations.2 1 In Tech-Bilt, Justice Grodin,
explained:
[a] vicariously liable defendant may seek an early full value settlement with the
plaintiff (anticipating reimbursement from the solvent fault-source tortfeasor) in
order to limit the potential exposure, reduce litigation costs, and obtain the plaintiff's
cooperation in litigation of the indemnity claim. If a liability insurance carrier is
controlling the defense, it may seek an early full-value settlement to avoid potential
liability to its insured for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing.
Under the rule espoused by the majority, a vicariously liable defendant will have a
great disincentive to enter into a full-value settlement agreement...
Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 823-24, 760 P.2d at 418, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (Kaufman, J.,
dissenting).
278. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 823-24, 760 P.2d at 418, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 221 (Kaufman,
J., dissenting).
279. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 820-28, 760 P.2d at 415-21, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 218-20
(Eagleson, J., concurring and dissenting). The court apparently found persuasive the hierarchy
of the three policies underlying contribution legislation as enumerated in Mesler v. Bragg
Management Co.: "First ... is the maximization of recovery to the injured party for the
amount of his [or her] injury to the extent fault of other has contributed to it . . .; Second
is the encouragement of settlement of the injure party's claim ... ; Third is the equitable
apportionment of liability among tortfeasors." Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d
290, 702 P.2d 601, 216 Cal. Rptr. 443 (1985). This hierarchy departs from principle of equitable
allocation of fault enumerated in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., but is consistent with the general
principle underlying vicarious liability that a plaintiff maximize his or her recovery for injury.
See supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text for discussion of fairness principle as enumerate
in Li.
280. See Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 818, 760 P.2d at 414, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (Kaufman,
J., concurring and dissenting) (no indication that trial judge considered that Far West's liability
was vicarious only). See also infra note 286 & supra note 273 and accompanying text for
practical settlement difficulties under Far West decision.
281. Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751 P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1987)
Pacific Law Journal / Vol. 21
concerned with burdening the trial courts with minitrials, stated that
the settlement need only be "in the ballpark. ' 28 2 Nevertheless, the
good faith inquiry has, as a practical matter, resulted in a minitrial
determination of good faith.us Minitrials clog the courts with unnec-
essary hearings and strain the resources of the entire judicial system. 28 4
Further, minitrial procedures contradict the public policy favoring
maximization of recovery to the injured party for the amount of his
or her injury by allowing strategic defensive delay tactics to weaken
a plaintiff's resolve and resources. Finally, minitrail determinations
of good faith of settlements possess the inherent danger of inconsis-
tent results in liability. 285 By placing the issue of total indemnity into
the good faith requirement of section 877.6, the California Supreme
Court in Far West preserved the complex and expensive minitrial
procedure of Tech-Bilt.286
(disapproving of minitrial procedure for determination of manufacturers liability for design
defects of DES). See also Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 502,
698 P.2d 159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) ("good faith" standard will
clog the courts with unnecessary pre-trial hearings).
282. Tech-Bilt, 38 Cal. 3d at 499, 698 P.2d at 166, 213 Cal. Rptr. at 263.
283. See Foley, Settling Out of a Multiparty Case, 5 CAL. LAW. 25, 26-8 (1985) (Tech-Bilt
"good faith" standard necessitates mini-trials involving examination of underlying issues of
liability, causation, and damages).
284. See Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assocs., 38 Cal. 3d 488, 502, 698 P.2d
159, 213 Cal. Rptr. 256 (1985) (Bird, C.J., dissenting) (pre-trial hearings requiring examination
of underlying issues clog the courts and intolerably burden trial courts).
285. See Comment, Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties, and Settlements, 64 CALin.
L. REv. 1264, 1275 (1977) (pro tanto reduction rule results in fluctuations of liability). For
example:
.. [S]uppose P. is injured by two tortfeasors, both equally at fault. If P suffers
damages of $10,000, a system in which the extent of fault governed the extent of
liability would presumably hold each tortfeasor liable for $5,000. If, however, P
settles with tortfeasor A for $3,000 and sues tortfeasor B, application of the pro
tanto reduction rule would subject tortfeasor B to liability for the remaining $7,000.
Conversely, if P had settled with tortfeasor A for $6,000, tortfeasor B's liability
would have only been $4,000, although the relative fault of the parties would not
have changed. Only in the situation where the parties to the settlement were able to
accurately predict the jury verdict of $10,000, and settle accordingly for $5,000,
would the defendant's liability be apportioned in relation to fault.
Id. at 1275 n.64. See also Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1068, 751 P.2d 470,
481-82, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412, 423 (1987) (minitrials to determine manufacture liability in DES
cases possess the inherent danger of inconsistent results between judges).
286. For example, assume an action for personal injury for $100,000 arising out of an
automobile accident with the following parties and liabilities:
Plaintiff (A) is 20% at fault.
Defendant (B), the driver, is 30% at fault.
Defendant (C), B's employer, is vicariously liable for B's tort.
Defendant (D), manufacturer of the brakes on B's truck, is 50% liable.
Hypothetical #1: B. settles prior to trial for $20,000.
The trial court must make a Tech-Bilt determination whether B's settlement is in
good faith. After Far West, the settlement may be in good faith even if C is not
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C. Meaning of "Joint Tortfeasor"
A joint tortfeasor for purposes of section 877.6 includes those
defendants whose liability is vicarious or derivative. 2 7 In Mesler v.
Bragg Management,2 1 the court held that section 877 eliminated the
distinction between successive and concurrent tortfeasors and included
tortfeasors allegedly liable for the same tort.2 9 The court in Far West
apparently expanded Mesler by holding that vicariously liable defen-
dants are joint tortfeasors within the meaning of section 877.6.290
released from the action. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 825, 760 P.2d at 419, 251 Cal.
Rptr. at 222 (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (majority refuses to hold as a matter of law
that a settlement which fails to provide for dismissal of vicarious liability causes of
action is not in good faith). At the pre-trial stages, the court must conduct a minitria
to determine percentages of fault. Subsequent litigation might show that B's settle-
ment was not in good faith because plaintiff had greater damages than originally
estimated. This would force the parties to relitigate the issues of good faith or leave
the vicariously liable defendant to bear a portion of the solvent employee's negligence.
Moreover, either defendant could frustrate plaintiff's recovery by delaying litigation
through litigation contesting good faith.
Hypothetical #2: C settles prior to trial for $20,000.
As a vicariously liable defendant, C's liability would be the same as B's under the
doctrine of joint and several liability. After Far West. C must demand that the
plaintiff dismiss against B. Otherwise, as happened in Far West, A could subsequently
settle with B for B's amount of damages and preclude C's indemnity rights. Further,
as in Far West, the Tech-Bilt approach may not adequately protect C if the trial
judge falls to account for the vicarious nature of C's liability. See Far West, 46
Cal. 3d at 818, 760 P.2d at 414, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 217 (Kaufman, J., dissenting)
(no indication that trial judge considered that Far West's liability was vicarious
only). A might also demand a price for C's request to dismiss against B and for
A's cooperation in the subsequent indemnity action against B; but this is a cost
which the fault source defendant should bear.
Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 826, 760 P.2d at 420, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 223 (Kaufman, J., dissenting).
287. The California Supreme Court did not expressly decide this issue. However, the Court
of Appeals decision held that Far West was a joint tortfeasor within the meaning of section
877.6. Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 234 Cal. Rptr. 771, 774 (Cal. App. 2 Dist. 1987).
See also Turcon Constr., v. Norton-Villiers, Ltd., Inc., 139 Cal. App. 3d 280, 188 Cal. Rptr.
580 (1983) (term "joint tortfeasor" embraces joint, concurrent and successive tortfeasors). But
see Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 819, 760 P.2d 399, 251 Cal. Rptr.
202 (1988) (Kaufman, J., concurring and dissenting) (vicariously liable defendant is not a
"tortfeasor" but an involuntary surety or guarantor). See also Comment, Indemnity in
California: Is it Really Equitable after American Motorcycle and section 877.6? 18 PAc. L.J.
201, 229 (1986) (expansion of the term joint tortfeasors to include blameless defendants would
be contrary to the historical meaning).
288. Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 302, 702 P.2d 601, 216 Cal. Rptr.
443 (1985).
289. See Mesler v. Bragg Management Co., 39 Cal. 3d 290, 302, 702 P.2d 601, 607-08,
216 Cal. Rptr. 443, 449-50 (1985) ("joint tortfeasors" in section 877 meant to include tortfeasors
claimed to be liable for the same tort and eliminate the distinction between joint tortfeasors
and concurrent or successive tortfeasors).
290. See Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 819, 760 P.2d 399, 414,
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Moreover, the court found that the policies underlying imposition of
vicarious liability are no different than the policies underlying other
forms of imputed tort liability such as strict products liability.29 '
IV. PROPOSAL
Pretrial settlement procedures after the decision in Far West are
needlessly complex and tolerate unfairness to joint tortfeasors. 292 The
present complex pretrial determination process conflicts with the
California Supreme Court's antipathy towards minitrial procedures. 293
Commentators have in the past argued for the repeal of the current
complex settlement practices in favor of less complicated practices
similar to those expressed in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act2 4
and the statutes of such states as New York.2 91 The decision in Far
West simply highlights the current need for the legislature to stream-
line via statutory enactment the pretrial settlement practices between
joint tortfeasors in California.
In Far West, the California Supreme Court recognized three pol-
icies inherent in settlement practices: the policy encouraging full
recovery by the plaintiff, the policy encouraging settlement of claims,
and the policy of equitably allocating fault among joint tortfeasors.
After Far West, settlement procedures will further settlements at the
251 Cal. Rptr. 202, 217 (1988) (Kaufman, J., dissenting) (vicariously liable defendant is not a
"tortfeasor" but an involuntary surety or guarantor). See also Angelus Assocs. Corp. v.
Neonex Leisure Prods., Inc., 167 Cal. App. 3d 532, 213 Cal. Rptr. 403 (1985) (vicariously
and derivatively liable defendants not tortfeasors within the meaning of section 877.6)
291. Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 813 n.13, 760 P.2d at 410-11, n.13, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 213-
14 n.13.
292. In 1986, the California voters passed Proposition 51 in order to hold defendants in
tort actions financially liable in proportion to their degree of fault. CAL, Civ. CODE § 1431.1(c)
(West Supp. 1989) (Prop. 51 expresses the policy that defendants be held financially liable in
closer proportion to their degree of fault). The unfairness of the decision in Far West apparently
contradicts the policies underlying Proposition 51.
293. See supra note 281 and accompanying text.
294. See Miller, Extending the Fairness Principle of Li and American Motorcycle: Adoption
of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act 14 PAC. L.J. 835 (1983); Adams, Settlements after Li:
But is it "Fair?" 10 PAC. L.J. 729, 743-49 (1979) (supporting provisions similar to the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act). See also UNIr. Comp. FAULT ACT, §§ 1-10, 12 U.L.A. 39 (West
Supp. 1989); Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort
Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle v. Superior Court, 30 HAsTiNos
L.J. 1465, 1510-12 (1979) (recommending adoption of provisions in Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in August 1977).
295. See infra notes 300-306 and accompanying text.
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expense of equitable allocation of fault. 296 If equitable allocation of
fault were the primary concern of the court, the court would have
allowed subsequent claims for indemnity under section 877.6. The
tension between the settlement policies reflected by decisions in lower
California courts was resolved in favor of settlements.
The policies inherent in California's statutory settlement practices
need not be conflicting, but may be simultaneously pursued. For
example, the New York state legislature responded to the creation
of partial indemnity by expressly reserving the right to total indem-
nity.297 On the other hand, some states reacted to the creation of
comparative fault by enacting the comprehensive settlement practices
enumerated in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act.298 Each approach
favors recovery by the plaintiff and equitable allocation of fault
among all parties to the action without jeopardizing the policy of
encouraging settlement of claims. 299
A. The New York Approach
New York General Obligations Law contains a release provision
similar to California section 877.6 that relieves a settling tortfeasor
from claims for contribution after a good faith settlement,)0I How-
ever, in response to the decision in Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,101
the New York State Legislature eliminated a settlement practice
analogous to California's pro tanto reduction of plaintiff's claim in
favor of a reduction of the released tortfeasor's equitable share of
296, Far West also appears to contradict the policy expressed in Proposition 51 to hold
defendants in tort actions financially liable in proportion to their degree of fault.
297, N.Y. Cv. PRAc. L. & R. 1404(b) (McKinney Supp. 1989) (rights to indemnity
preserved). See supra note 68 (discussing adoption of loss sharing between joint tortfeasors in
New York in Dole).
298. UNF. Comp. FAULT ACT, §§ 1-10, 12 U.L.A. 39 (West Supp, 1989) (comprehensive
settlement statute for those states adopting comparative fault). See also UNIoM CONTRIBUTION
AtioNo ToRTOEsoas ACT (1955) (comprehensive settlement statute for those states not applying
the principle of comparative fault). Washington substantially adopted the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act in 1981. See WAsH REv. CODE ANN, §§ 4.22.0054.22.925 (West Supp. 1989)
(substantially adopting the provisions of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act). Iowa substan-
tially adopted the Uniform Comparative Fault Act in 1984. See IowA CODIE ANN. §§ 668.1-
668.14 (substantially adopting the provisions of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act).
299. See infra notes 300-321 and accompanying text for discussion of settlement practices
under approaches in New York and states adopting Uniform Comparative Fault Act.
300. N.Y. GEN. OBLiG. LAw § 15-108(b) (West Supp. 1989).
301. Dole v. Dow Chem. Co. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382, 282 N.E,2d 288 (1972)
(creating partial indemnity doctrine in New York).
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fault.3 2 The New York State Legislature found that the elimination
of pro tanto reduction in comparative fault situations encouraged
settlements among joint tortfeasors. °3 Further, the New York State
Legislature created a statutory right to contribution while preserving
a nonsettling tortfeasors right to total indemnity. 04 However, al-
though the vicariously liable defendant's right to indemnity is pre-
served, the plaintiff's claim against the vicariously liable defendant
is reduced on a pro tanto basis rather than on the basis of equitable
share of fault. 30 5 By allowing indemnity claims, New York simulta-
neously encourages settlement while promoting the policy of equitable
allocation of fault among joint tortfeasors. The California State
Legislature could encourage settlement and promote the policy of
equitably allocation fault among joint tortfeasors by emulating the
302. N.Y. GEN. OBuo. LAW § 15-108 (a) (West Supp. 1989). Section 15-108 provides that
a release given to a joint tortfeasor "reduces the claim of the releasor against the other
tortfeasors to the extent of any amount stipulated by the release or the covenant, or in the
amount of the consideration paid for it, or in the amount of the released tortfeasor's equitable
share of the damages.... whichever is greatest." Id.
303. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 15-108(a)-practice commentary at 717 ('West Supp. 1989).
304. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 1401-1404 (McKinney Supp. 1989) (creating statutory right
to contribution and preserving rights to total indemnity).
305. N.Y. Crv. PRAc. L. & R. 1404:2-practice comments at 382 (McKinney 1974). The
practice comments suggest that the provisions of General Obligations Law sections 15-108 with
respect to releases do not rob a principal of his claim for indemnity when the active wrongdoer
settles first. Id. Further, in order to encourage settlements, the plaintiff's claim is not reduced
by the agent's equitable share (100%), but is reduced on a pro tanto basis. See also N.Y. Civ.
PRAc. L. & R. 1404:2-practice comments at 138-39 (McKinney Supp. 1989). The supplemental
practice comments cite the decision in Riviello v. Waldron, 47 N.Y.2d 297, 391 N.E.2d 1278,
418 N.Y.S.2d 300 (1979) as an example of settlement practices in New York involving a case
of vicarious liability. Id. In Riviello v. Waldron, a bartender negligently injured one of the
patrons. The plaintiff sued both the bartender and the bar. Prior to trial, the plaintiff settled
with the bartender for $25,000, but won a $200,000 verdict against the bar alone. The bar
argued that since its liability was based on vicarious liability, the plaintiff's claim should be
reduced by the bartender's equitable share of fault; ie. 100%. Consequently, the bar argued
that its liability must be reduced to zero. The practice comments explain that General
Obligations Law sections 15-108 does not apply in indemnity situations based on vicarious
liability. See also Survey of New York Practice, 59 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 419, 421-22 (1985)
(courts interpreting General Obligations Law sections 15-108 have determined that it does not
apply to indemnification claims). Thus, the general rule in New York is that when A and B
are both liable in tort to the plaintiff for equitable shares measurable at less that 100% (i.e.
contribution), a release given to A reduces B's liability by the amount of the release or by the
size of A's equitable share whichever is greater. N.Y. GEN. OBLIao. LAW § 15-108 (McKinney
Supp. 1989). When A and B are liable in tort for the same injury, but as between them B is
entitled to full indemnity from A, a release given to A merely reduces B's liability to the
plaintiff by the amount of the release. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. L. & R. 1404:2-practice comments
at 138-39 (McKinney Supp. 1989). Thus, the proper approach is to preserve the bar's rights
to total indemnity and reduce the plaintiff's claim against the bar on a pro tanto basis.
Consequently, the plaintiff's claim against the bar is reduced to $175,000 and the bar retains
the right to claim indemnity against the settling bartender.
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New York approach of statutory preservation of claims for total
indemnity. °6
B. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act Approach
The California legislature enacted section 877.6 despite testimony
and commentary recommending settlement practices embodied in the
Uniform Comparative Fault Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act).
307
Various provisions of the Act have received favorable commentary
from California courts308 and commentators09 and have been en-
306. But see Wilner & Farrell, Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.: The Kaleidoscopic Impact of
a Leading Case, 42 BRooKLYN L. Rnv. 457, 465 (1976) (section 15-108 encourages defendants
to settle, but discourages settlement by plaintiffs because plaintiff's lawyers will be disinclined
to settle absent certainty that the settlement is equivalent to settlor's proportionate share of
liability). See also DeWolf, Several Liability and the Effect of Settlement on Claim Reduction:
Further Thoughts, 23 GONZAGA L. Rv. 37, 66 (1988) (nonsensical to encourage defendants
to settle while discouraging plaintiffs to settle). However, in deciding whether or not to settle,
a plaintiff must always weigh such factors as risk of unfavorable judgment at trial, immediate
need for recovery, and possibility that the settlement will be high or low. See Comment,
Comparative Negligence, Multiple Parties, and Settlements, 65 CALiF. L. Rnv. 1264, 1277-8
(1977) (factors relating to plaintiff's decision to settle are present whether multiparty or single
party litigation). Of course, the plaintiff has the last say on the decision whether or not to
settle. If he does not wish to assume the risk of an undervalued settlement, he need not settle.
On the other hand, the plaintiff has a strong incentive to drive the hardest bargain. See
Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort Liability on the
Problems Associated with American Motorcycle v. Superior Court, 30 HAsnms L.J. 1465,
1496 (1979) (self regulating device of giving plaintiff decision on whether or not to settle is
more effective that "good faith" inquiry). Consequently, as the plaintiff has control over the
decision to settle, the primary focus in settlement practices should be to encourage the
defendants to settle. See Comment, Comparative Negligence, 65 CA~n'. L. Ray. at 1278 (most
plaintiffs settle their claims because certainty of immediate recovery combined with possibility
of high recovery outweighs possibility of loss).
307. See Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort
Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle v. Superior Court, 30 HAsTiNGs
L.J. 1465, 1510 (1979) (recommendations are embodied in the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act, promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
August 1977). For criticism subsequent to the adoption of section 877.6, see also Miller,
Extending the Fairness Principle of Li and American Motorcycle: Adoption of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, 14 Pc. L.J. 835 (1983) (urging adoption of the Act in California).
Section 877.6 was enacted in order to provide a pretrial hearing, as opposed to a separate
jury trial, on the issue of the good faith of the settlement. See Review of Selected 1980
California Legislation, 12 PAc. L.J. 290, 290-91 (1980).
308. See Allen v. Sundeam, 137 Cal. App. 3d 216, 186 Cal. Rptr. 863 (1983) (approving
section l(b) of the Act relating to intentional torts); Sorensen v. Allred, 112 Cal. App. 3d
717, 723-25, 169 Cal. Rptr. 441, 444-46 (1980) (approving portions of the Act relating to
willful and wanton behavior); Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 332, 579
P.2d 441, 446, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 555 (1978) (Act authority for apportioning negligence
between a strictly liable defendant and negligent defendant). In Daly v. General Motors, the
California Supreme Court commented:
We find additional significance in the provisions of the proposed Uniform Compar-
ative Fault Act (Act), authored by Professor Wade, a recognized torts scholar,
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dorsed by California courts. 10 However, complete adoption of the
Act by California courts would be contrary to certain statutory
provisions,31' would effectively overrule portions of the decision in
Far West 312 and would be beyond the scope of judicial authority. 313
Therefore, in order to balance the policies underlying the settlement
practices in California, the legislature must act.
a. Good faith
Adoption of the Act would eliminate the complex Far West good
faith minitrial by replacing the statutory pro tanto reduction mech-
anism with procedures reducing the plaintiff's claim against nonset-
tling defendants by the settling tortfeasor's equitable share of fault. 314
The plaintiff would retain ultimate control over the decision whether
or not to settle and ultimately would be required to decide if the
consideration for the settlement approximates his or her best estimate
of the settling tortfeasor's share of liability.315 With clear knowledge
distinguished professor of law, and former dean, Vanderbilt University, current
reporter of the Restatement Second of Torts, and chairman of the special committee
on the Act of the National Conference of the Commissioners on Uniform States
Laws (Conference). Our attention has been called to the action of the Conference
in August 1977, wherein it approved adoption of the Act by a vote of 40 states to
8 (California voting favorably). The Act is the distillation of approximately five
years of discussion, analysis, and contribution by a special committee and a review
committee of the Conference ... While lacking any legislative sanction the Act, in
our view, points in the direction of a responsible national trend.
Daly v. General Motors Corp., 20 Cal. 3d 725, 742-3, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380,
389-90 (1978).
309. See Fleming, Report to the Joint Committee of the California Legislature on Tort
Liability on the Problems Associated with American Motorcycle v. Superior Court, 30 HASTINGs
L.J. 1465, 1510 (1979) (recommendations are embodied in the Act, promulgated by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in August 1977). See also
Miller, Extending fairness principle of Li and American Motorcycle: Adoption of the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act, 14 PAC. L.J. 835 (1983) (urging adoption of the Act).
310. See Commercial Cleaning Corp. v. Allied Chem. Co., 206 Cal. App. 3d 1066, 254
Cal. Rptr. 401, 408-10 (1988) (adopting the equitable share reduction mechanism of the Act
over the pro tanto reduction mechanism of California law in federal maritime claims); Jess v.
Herrman, 26 Cal. 3d 131, 141 n.5, 604 P.2d 208, 213 n.5, 161 Cal. Rptr. 87, 92 n.5 (1979)
(adopting section 3 of the Act relating to set off provisions).
311. Enactment of the Act would require the repeal of California Code of Civil Procedure
sections 875-877 dealing with contribution among tortfeasors. Fleming, supra note 309 at 1511.
312. See Far West, 46 Cal. 3d at 808, 760 P.2d at 407, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 210 (holding
that indemnity is one end of the spectrum of comparative negligence).
313. See Jess v. Herrman, 26 Cal. 3d 131, 152-53, 604 P.2d 208, 221, 161 Cal. Rptr. 87,
100 (1979) (Manuel, J., dissenting) (majority usurped legislative authority by adopting section
3 of the Act).
314. UNIt. Comp. FAuLT ACT § 2. See Fleming, supra note 309 at 1496 n.133 (Act
eliminates pro tanto reduction mechanism in favor of equitable share of fault reduction).
315. Fleming, supra note 309 at 1497.
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and predictability of the ramifications of settlement, the plaintiff
could make the decision whether the offer to settle was satisfactory.
316
Thus, the elimination of the pro tanto reduction system would
encourage settlement and equitably allocate fault in accordance with
Li and American Motorcycle.
31 7
b. Indemnity
The Act pertains only to comparative fault and does not alter the
common law rule for indemnity.318 Defendants who are vicariously
or derivatively liable may be dealt with under the common law in
one of two ways. First, as one commentator points out, situations
in which one defendant is vicariously liable for the torts of another
should be exempted from reallocation under equitable share of fault
principles and should be reduced pro tanto in order to encourage
settlements.3 1 9 Alternatively, a vicariously liable defendant is subject
to the same equitable fault reduction mechanism as a comparatively
at fault defendant under the Act.
Under the second approach, the plaintiff would settle with the
fault source and derivatively liable defendants as a unit; a settlement
with the fault source tortfeasor reducing the equitable share by 100%
and dismissing as a practical matter the case against the vicariously
liable defendant. The second approach would not deter settlements.
If the fault source tortfeasor is solvent, then the plaintiff must
recover from that tortfeasor and dismiss as a practical matter the
derivatively liable defendant. If the active tortfeasor can not pay the
316. See Harris, Washington's Unique Approach to Partial Tort Settlements: The Modified
Pro Tanto Credit and the Reasonableness Hearing Requirement, 20 GONZAGA L. REv. 69, 77
(1985) (best method for promoting goal of settlement is to provide litigants with both the
incentive to settle and with clear, predictable rules regarding the effect of settlement).
317. See supra note 306 (noting that the encouragement of defendants to settle should be
of primary focus as risks inherent in plaintiff's decision whether or not to settle do not
change); American Motorcycle, 20 Cal. 3d at 598, 578 P.2d at 912, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 195; Li,
13 Cal. 3d at 808, 532 P.2d at 1229, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
318. See Rees v. Dallas County, 372 N.W.2d 503, 506 (Iowa 1985) (adoption of comparative
negligence does not alter common liability rule for indemnity); Noia v. Ferrell-Penning, Inc.,
36 Wash. App. 13, 671 P.2d 790 (1983), remanded 688 P.2d 499 (1984), remanded 689 P.2d
1065 (1984) (apportionment based on relative fault not applicable in cases of full indemnity).
319. See Miller, Extending the Fairness Principle of Li and American Motorcycle: Adoption
of the Uniform Comparative Fault Act, 14 PAc. L.J. 835, 863-64 n.164 (1983) ("In establishing
the reallocation principle of the Act it would be possible to exempt from reallocation those
situations in which one defendant would be vicariously liable for the damage caused by another
under agency principles."). See also Riviello v. Waldron supra note 305 for discussion of New
York approach to vicarious liability under equitable share reduction approach.
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entire amount of plaintiff's damages, then the derivatively liable
defendant must decide whether the strength of the plaintiff's case
merits settlement.
c. Settlement Policies
The Act furthers the policy of encouraging plaintiffs' recovery by
retaining the common law principle of joint and several liability. 20
The plaintiff's decision to settle contains the same risks under both
existing law and the Act, but the Act provides greater incentive for
defendants to settle than existing law.3 21 Moreover, the Act neither
discourages settlements as a whole nor jeopardizes the principle of
equitable allocation of fault among all tortfeasors. After Far West,
a nonsettling vicariously liable defendant would rather litigate than
settle a claim for which he can never be indemnified. Under the Act,
the vicariously liable defendant is protected by the plaintiff's deter-
mination to settle and the future right to total indemnity, not by the
320. Uirm. Comp. FAULT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 39, 40 (Supp. 1989) (commissioners' comment
to section 2) (common law rule of joint and several liability continues to apply under the Act),
See also American Motorcycle v. Superior Court, 20 Cal. 3d 578, 591, 578 P.2d 899, 906, 146
Cal. Rptr. 182, 189 (1978) (abandonment of joint and several liability would have serious and
unwarranted deleterious effect on ability of negligently injured plaintiffs to recover for their
injuries).
The Act provides a solution for the problem of the insolvent tortfeasor. See UNri. COmp.
FAUmT ACT, 12 U.L.A. 39, 47 (commissioners' comment to section 2) (Supp. 1989). For
example:
A sues B, C and D. A's damages are $10,000.
A is found 40% at fault.
B is found 30% at fault.
C is found 30% at fault.
D is found 0% at fault.
A is awarded judgment jointly and severally against B & C for $6,000. The court
also states in the judgment the equitable share of the obligation of each party:
A's equitable share is $4,000 (40% of $10,000)
B's equitable share is $3,000 (30% of $10,000)
C's equitable share is $3,000 (30% of $10,000)
On proper motion to the Court, C shows that B's share is uncollectible. The court
orders that B's equitable share be allocated between A and C.
A's equitable share is increased by $1,714 (4/7 of $3,000)
C's equitable share is increased by $1,236 (3/7 of $3,000)
Id. The legislature could conversely conclude that the plaintiff should fully recover for his or
her loss and not be forced to absorb part of the loss of the insolvent tortfeasor. Although
this approach would clearly contradict the equitable allocation of fault mandated by Li, the
legislature is the proper decisionmaking body to alter the hierarchy of settlement policies. See
Jess v. Herrman, 26 Cal. 3d 131, 152-53, 604 P.2d 208, 221, 161 Cal. Rptr. 87, 100 (1979)
(Manuel, J., dissenting) (legislature, not the courts, is the proper body to decide equity and
wisdom of policy decisions).
321. See supra note 306 (discussing incentives to settle under New York approach).
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illusory protection afforded under the Far West!Tech-Bilt approach.
CONCLUSION
The introduction of loss sharing principles in California had far-
reaching implications for parties in multi-party litigation. Fairness
and the encouragement of settlement dictate that a tortfeasor who
settles in good faith with a plaintiff should be shielded from subse-
quent claims for loss sharing under comparative fault. However,
doctrinal distinctions dictate that rights to shift the entire loss (ie.
seek indemnity) should not be affected by a settlement. In Far West
Financial Corp. v. D & S Co.32 the California Supreme Court held
that a good faith settlement by a joint tortfeasor barred subsequent
actions by derivatively or vicariously liable defendants for total
equitable indemnity. The decision preserves the cumbersome and
expensive mini-trial procedures of Tech-Bilt at the expense of fairness
to nonsettling vicariously liable defendants.
In order to return to the principle of equitably allocating fault
among tortfeasors under Li and Proposition 51, the legislature must
change the present system of settlement practices. The legislature
could adopt an approach, such as New York, which legislatively
preserves total indemnity rights. Alternatively, the legislature could
adopt the systemic change urged by commentators, the California
Supreme Court, and this note. Such a legislative change would clarify
the confusion surrounding the distinctly separate concepts of contri-
bution and indemnity. The result would be a more streamlined and
fair settlement procedure in the California trial courts. Legislative
action would preserve the policies underlying the settlement practices
in California: recovery by the plaintiff, encouragement of settlements,
and equitable allocation of loss among all tortfeasors.
Scott J. Hyman
322. Far West Fin. Corp. v. D & S Co., 46 Cal. 3d 796, 760 P.2d 399, 251 Cal. Rptr.
202 (1988).

